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WARREN E. BURGER IS DEAD AT 87
Was Chief Justice for 17 Years
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
June 26, 1995, Monday
Linda Greenhouse
Washington, June 25 - Warren E. Burger, who retired
in 1986 after 17 years as the 15th Chief Justice of the
United States, died here today at age 87. The cause
was congestive heart failure, a spokeswoman for the
Supreme Court said.
An energetic court administrator, Chief Justice
Burger was in some respects a transitional figure
despite his tenure, the longest for a Chief Justice in
this century. He presided over a Court that, while it
grew steadily more conservative with subsequent
appointments, nonetheless remained strongly
influenced by the legacy of his liberal predecessor,
Chief Justice Earl Warren. The constitutional right to
abortion and the validity of busing as a remedy for
school segregation were both established during Chief
Justice Burger's tenure, and with his support.
The country knew Chief Justice Burger as a
symbol before it knew much about him as a man or a
judge.
He was President Richard M. Nixon's first
Supreme Court nominee, and Mr. Nixon had
campaigned on a pledge to find "strict
constructionists" and "practitioners of judicial
restraint" who would turn back the activist tide that
the Court had built under Chief Justice Warren, its
leader since 1953.
The nomination on May 21, 1969, immediately
made Mr. Burger, a white-haired, 61 -year-old Federal
appeals court judge, a lightning rod for those who
welcomed as well as those who feared the end of an
era ofjudicial activism.
It was a central contradiction of Mr. Burger's
tenure as Chief Justice that long after he became one
of the most visible and, in many ways, innovative
Chief Justices in history he remained, for many
people, the symbol of retrenchment that Mr. Nixon
had presented to the public on nominating him.
In fact, the Supreme Court in the Burger years
was in its way as activist as the Court that preceded it,
creating new constitutional doctrine in areas like the
right to privacy, due process and sexual equality that
the Warren Court had only hinted at.
"All in all," one Supreme Court scholar, A. E.
Dick Howard, wrote in the Wilson Quarterly in 1981,
"the Court is today more of a center for the resolution
of social issues than it has ever been before."
While there were some substantial changes of
emphasis, the Burger Court - a label liberals tended
to apply like an epithet -- overruled no major
decisions from the Warren era.
It was a further incongruity that despite Chief
Justice Burger's high visibility and the evident relish
with which he used his office to expound his views on
everything from legal education to prison
management, scholars and Supreme Court
commentators continued to question the degree to
which he actually led the institution over which he so
energetically presided.
His important opinions for the Court included the
decision that validated busing as a tool for school
desegregation, the one that struck down the
"legislative veto" used by Congress for 50 years to
block executive branch actions, and the one that
spurred President Nixon's resignation in 1974 by
forcing him to turn over White House tape recordings
for use in the Watergate investigations. Yet Chief
Justice Burger was just as often in dissent on major
decisions. In that, he differed from Chief Justice
Warren, who voted with the majority in nearly all
important cases.
Those seeking to identify the sources of
intellectual leadership on the Court usually pointed to
William H. Rehnquist, another Nixon appointee to
whom Chief Justice Burger assigned many important
opinions, and to William J. Brennan Jr., the Court's
most senior and, with Thurgood Marshall, most
liberal member.
As the senior Associate Justice, Justice Brennan
had the right to assign the opinion in any case in
which h-e was i m t theCi Justice
was in dissent, and he often exercised that prerogative
by assigning major opinions to himself, particularly in
the area of individual rights.
As the years passed, Chief Justice Burger seemed
to assign himself the opinions in relatively
straightforward and uncontroversial cases, avoiding
those in which the Court was deeply split and in
which it would have required considerable effort to
marshal or hold a fragile majority. As a result, his
personal imprint on the Court's jurisprudence was not
always readily identifiable.
AN INNOVATOR IN ADMINISTRATION
But his imprint was distinct in the area to which
he gave his most sustained attention, judicial
administration.
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Mr. Burger liked to say that he took his title
seriously. He was Chief Justice of the United States,
not just of the Supreme Court, and he took as his
mandate the stewardship of the entire judicial system,
state as well as Federal.
An array of institutions were created under his
aegis, including the National Center for State Courts,
the Institute for Court Management and the National
Institute of Corrections. The common purpose of those
organizations was to improve the education and
training of participants in nearly all phases of the
judicial process, whether judges, court clerks or prison
guards.
The Chief Justice turned the small Federal
Judicial Center, for which he served by statute as
chairman of the board, into a major center for research
and publishing about the courts.
He believed that judges could be helped to be
more efficient if professional management techniques
were imported to the courts, from clerks' offices to
judges' chambers. The Institute for Court Management
set up a six-month program for training court
managers and administrators.
The Supreme Court itself became one of the first
fully computerized courts in the country; in 1981, the
Justices all received computer terminals on which to
compose their opinions.
The Chief Justice campaigned tirelessly for better
pay for judges, better education for lawyers and help
for the Court's ever-growing caseload. From his
earliest years in office, he warned that the Federal
courts and the Supreme Court in particular were
becoming dangerously overworked.
In 1983, he asked Congress to create an appellate
panel that could relieve some of the Supreme Court's
caseload by resolving conflicting opinions among the
Federal appeals courts.
MANY ADMIRERS, BUT DETRACTORS AS
WELL
Judges and others interested in these long-ignored
administrative issues responded with gratitude. One of
the Chief Justice's warmest admirers on the Federal
bench was Frank M. Johnson Jr., a Federal appeals
court judge from Alabama who won praise from civil
rights advocates for his orders on prison issues and
other rulings.
"Warren Burger has redefined the nature of his
office," Judge Johnson wrote in the early 1980's. "He
has concentrated his energy not simply on exploring
the subtleties of constitutional doctrine but on
reforming the mechanics of American justice. More
than any of his 14 predecessors, he has invested the
prestige of the Chief Justiceship in efforts to make the
American judicial system function more efficiently. He
has used his position not as an excuse to withdraw
from public affairs but as an opportunity to furnish
public leadership."
But the priority that Chief Justice Burger
assigned to administration also had its detractors, who
complained that he trivialized his office by
emphasizing the mechanics ofjustice at the expense of
its substance.
Occasionally, too, his enthusiastic lobbying was
seen as overbearing by those at whom it was directed.
In 1978, for example, he became deeply involved in
the effort in Congress to overhaul the bankruptcy
system.
One Democratic senator, Dennis DeConcini of
Arizona, whose subcommittee had jurisdiction over
the bill, complained publicly that a "very, very irate
and rude" Chief Justice had telephoned him to object
to a legislative development and "not only lobbied but
pressured and attempted to be intimidating."
The Chief Justice could also be rather
intimidating from the bench, particularly when a
relatively inexperienced lawyer was arguing a position
with which Mr. Burger disagreed. While Chief Justice
Warren's favorite question from the bench was, "Yes,
but was it fair?" Chief Justice Burger often asked:
"Yes, but why is this case in the courts? Isn't this a
matter for the Legislature to address?"
WORKING TO LIMIT THE JUDICIARY'S SCOPE
Chief Justice Burger believed in a limited role for
the courts and reserved some of his sharpest criticism
for those who looked to them to resolve social and
political problems that, in his view, were not the
province ofjudges. "If we get the notion that courts
can cure all injustices, we're barking up the wrong
tree," he liked to say.
A speech he gave while he was still a judge on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
provided a useful summary of the view he held
throughout his career: "That courts encounter some
problems for which they can supply no solution is not
invariably an occasion for regret or concern. This is an
essential limitation in a system of divided power."
Some of the more important decisions while he
was Chief Justice were those that limited litigants'
access to Federal court by using the doctrines of
standing, mootness and deference to state courts.
He seemed to regard suits for small monetary
stakes as a waste of judges' time, and many of his
speeches complained about the disproportionate cost
to the system of trying the lawsuits brought by
prisoners or consumers over modest losses of money
or property.
His questioning of one lawyer, who argued in
1982 on behalf of 168,000 consumers, each with a
claim for $7.98 against the Gillette Company, was the
talk of the Court for weeks. "What is the economic
justification for this kind of lawsuit in the Federal
courts under any circumstances?" the Chief Justice
demanded.
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"We are in state court, judge, in this case," the
lawyer, Robert S. Atkins, replied.
"In state or Federal court?" the Chief Justice
persisted.
"The problem," Mr. Atkins said, "is that if you
cheat people a little bit but do it a lot, you can go free
The Chief Justice interrupted to interrogate him
about the proportion of the recovery that would go for
legal fees.
INVITING ATTENTION, SOME OF THE TIME
Chief Justice Burger's effort to police the moral
character of lawyers who sought to become eligible to
argue before the Court rankled some of the other
Justices and in 1982 provided a rare public glimpse of
internal disagreements over the Chief Justice's
administrative approach.
He singled out several applicants by name and
accused them of seeking membership in the Supreme
Court bar to "launder" tarnished credentials. But he
failed to persuade a majority of the Court to block the
admissions and provoked one Justice, John Paul
Stevens, to write that the Court should grant
applicants with questionable credentials a "fair
hearing" before publicly labeling them as unworthy.
There were contradictory strains in Chief Justice
Burger's attitude toward the public, including the
press. At times he seemed to welcome and even invite
public attention. He took pride in having made the
Supreme Court a more attractive place for tourists to
visit, transforming the cold marble ground floor into
an area for historical exhibits.
Yet he alone of all the Justices refused, when
announcing one of his opinions from the bench, to
provide tourists and lawyers in the audience with a
brief oral description of the case and the decision.
The other Justices either read aloud from a
memorandum explaining the case or gave a more
casual oral account. YIIenI U Cif~ JUstiLce t LUll
came, he would simply announce that in a case with a
particular name, the judgment of the lower court was
affirmed, or reversed. When asked why he refused to
join the others in explaining his opinions, he once
said, "It's a waste of time."
He was adamant about preserving the secrecy of
the Court's internal operations, even to the extent of
refusing to make public the names of his four law
clerks. A law firm recruiter or other member of the
public who called the Court's public information
office seeking a list of the current law clerks would
receive the names of all the clerks except the Chief
Justice's.
He mailed copies of his speeches to hundreds of
journalists around the country and would telephone
particular columnists to make sure his message was
clear.
DEFINING THE LIMITS OF SPEECH AND PRESS
Occasionally, usually in connection with his
annual "State of the Judiciary" address to the
American Bar Association, a tradition that he
inaugurated, he would invite journalists for informal
"deep background" briefings, sessions that were often
relaxed and informative.
But he seemed to hold much of the press corps in
low repute. Asked by a lawyer at a Smithsonian
Institution symposium what he thought of the
reporters who covered the Court, he replied, as he
often did: "I admire those who do a good job, and I
have sympathy for the rest, who are in the majority."
Special scorn was reserved for television, which
he regarded as an intrusive annoyance. He once
knocked a television camera out of the hand of a
network cameraman who followed him into an
elevator. He vowed that he would never allow oral
arguments at the Supreme Court to be televised.
Yet he wrote the opinion for the Court in the
1981 case Chandler v. Florida, holding that a state
could permit a criminal trial to be televised, even over
the defendant's objection, without depriving the
defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial.
Chief Justice Burger wrote several of the Court's
most important opinions interpreting the free speech
and free press guarantees of the First Amendment.
His opinion in a 1976 case, Nebraska Press v.
Stuart, effectively prohibited judges from ordering the
press not to publish information in its possession
about a crime, a confession or the like. The opinion
said that judges could take less drastic steps to protect
criminal defendants from negative pretrial publicity,
like sequestering the jury or changing the site of the
trial.
A 1973 opinion by the Chief Justice ended
roughly 15 years of turmoil over the legal definition of
obscenity by changing the focus to local communities,
rather than the entire country.
That opinion, in Miller v. California, said
obscene materials were "works which, taken as a
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." The Chief Justice
added that it was up to local juries applying
"contemporary community standards" to decide
whether a particular work fit that definition.
"It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound
to read the First Amendment as requiring that the
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
New York City," he wrote. "People in different states
vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is
not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity."
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RELIGION, RIGHTS AND VETO POWER
Chief Justice Burger was also one of the Court's
most prolific writers on another aspect of the First
Amendment, the clause prohibiting establishment of
an official national religion. In a 1971 opinion,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, he set forth the test for deciding
whether a given law or government program that
conferred some benefit on religion nonetheless passed
muster under the First Amendment.
"First," he wrote, "the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
This "three-part test," as it came to be known through
later refinements and elaborations, defined the Court's
approach to the establishment clause in a variety of
contexts.
The 1983 decision that struck down the
legislative veto, Immigration Service v. Chadha,
altered the balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches.
It invalidated a procedure, which Congress had
incorporated into some 200 laws, permitting one or
both houses to block executive branch action. The
procedure, Chief Justice Burger wrote, was not within
Congress's constitutional authority because it did not
follow the rules the Constitution set out for
"legislation": passage by both houses and presentment
to the President for his signature.
The Chadha opinion in many ways summarized
the Chief Justice's view of American Government. He
wrote, "With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness
and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better
way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise
of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints
spelled out in the Constitution."
Chief Justice Burger wrote relatively few of the
Court's criminal law decisions, and some of the more
important decisions on the rights of criminal suspects
found him in bitter dissent.
For example, in the 1977 case Brewer v.
Williams the Court ruled, in a 5-to-4 opinion by
Justice Potter Stewart, that the police had violated a
murder suspect's constitutional right to counsel. The
police officers, knowing that the suspect was deeply
religious, delivered what came to be called the
Christian burial speech, musing aloud on the wish of
the victim's parents to give their daughter a Christian
burial. The suspect, who had previously said he would
talk only after seeing a lawyer, then led the officers to
the victim's body.
The majority's decision overturning the murder
conviction was "bizarre," the Chief Justice wrote in a
dissent that was a stinging attack on the so-called
exclusionary rule barring the use at trial of illegally
seized evidence.
"The result reached by the Court in this case
ought to be intolerable in any society which purports
to call itself an organized society," he said. "Failure to
have counsel in a pretrial setting should not lead to the
'knee-jerk' suppression of relevant and reliable
evidence."
A CONSERVATIVE ON CRIME ISSUES
The Chief Justice dissented from the Court's 1972
decision that invalidated all death penalty laws then in
force. After the Court permitted executions to resume
four years later, the Chief Justice grew increasingly
impatient with the legal obstacles that lawyers and
judges continued to place in the way of executions.
When the Court refused to block the execution of
a murderer whose appeals had lasted 10 years, Chief
Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion excoriating
lawyers for condemned inmates. He said the lawyers
sought to turn the administration of justice into a
"sporting contest."
Although Chief Justice Burger's views on
criminal law did not always garner a majority on the
Supreme Court, those views had probably been more
responsible for his being nominated to the High Court
than any other factor.
In 13 years on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, he was known as
a conservative, law-and-order judge. He enhanced that
reputation with speeches and articles. A speech in
1967 at Ripon College in Wisconsin came to Richard
Nixon's attention after it was reprinted in U.S. News
& World Report.
The White House distributed copies of the speech
at the time of Judge Burger's nomination, and the
Supreme Court press office handed it out for years
when asked for information about his views. In the
speech, he compared the American system of justice
with the systems of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and
the Netherlands.
"I assume that no one will take issue with me
when I say that these North European countries are as
enlightened as the United States in the value they
place on the individual and on human dignity," he
said.
Yet, he continued, those countries "do not
consider it necessary to use a device like our Fifth
Amendment, under which an accused person may not
be required to testify."
"They go swiftly, efficiently and directly to the
question of whether the accused is guilty," he added.
"No nation on earth," he said, "goes to such
lengths or takes such pains to provide safeguards as
we do, once an accused person is called before the bar
ofjustice and until his case is completed."
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A MODEST START IN MINNESOTA
Chief Justice Burger's speechmaking style
changed little in subsequent years. He often returned
to the theme and imagery of the Ripon speech and
often used the Scandinavian countries, which he
visited frequently, as benchmarks against which to
compare the American system.
Warren Earl Burger was born Sept. 17, 1907, in
St. Paul. His parents, of Swiss-German descent, were
Charles Joseph Burger and the former Katharine
Schnittger. His paternal grandfather, Joseph Burger,
emigrated from Switzerland and joined the Union
Army at the start of the Civil War, when he was 14.
He was severely wounded in combat and received both
a battlefield commission and the Medal of Honor.
Warren Burger was one of seven children. The
family lived on a 20-acre truck farm on the outskirts
of St. Paul. In addition to farming, his father sold
weighing scales; the family's financial circumstances
were modest.
At John A. Johnson High School, from which
Warren Burger graduated in 1925, he edited the
school newspaper, was president of the student
council and earned letters in hockey, football, track
and swimming. He earned extra money by selling
articles on high school sports and other news to the St.
Paul newspapers.
The rest of his formal education took place in
night.school while he worked days selling insurance
for the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.
He attended the night school division of the University
of Minnesota for two years, then began night law
classes at the St. Paul College of Law, now known as
the William Mitchell College of Law. He received his
degree with high honors in 1931.
He joined the faculty of the law school and taught
for 12 years while practicing law with the firm of
Boyesen, Otis & Faricy. He remained with the firm,
one of the oldest in the state, for 22 years; after he
became a partner, the firm was known as Faricy,
Burger, Moore & Costello. He handled probate, trial
and appellate cases, arguing more than a dozen before
the United States Supreme Court and many more in
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
He married Elvera Stromberg in 1933. They had
a son, Wade Allen, and a daughter, Margaret
Elizabeth.
As a young lawyer, Mr. Burger became active in
community affairs. He was president of the Junior
Chamber of Commerce and the first president of the
St. Paul Council on Human Relations. That group,
which he helped to organize, sponsored training
programs for the police to improve relations with
minority groups. For many years, he was a member of
the Governor's Interracial Commission.
He also became involved in state politics,
working on Harold E. Stassen's successful campaign
for governor. He went to the 1948 Republican
National Convention to help Governor Stassen's
unsuccessful bid for the Presidential nomination.
MAKING THE MOVE TO WASHINGTON
In 1952, he was at the Republican convention
again, still a Stassen supporter. But he helped Dwight
D. Eisenhower's forces win a crucial credentials fight
against Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. On the final
day, with General Eisenhower lacking nine votes for
the nomination, Mr. Burger helped swing the
Minnesota delegation and gave Eisenhower the votes
that put him over the top. Cheers broke out on the
convention floor as an organ played the University of
Minnesota fight song.
His reward was ajob in Washington, as Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division of the
Justice Department. He supervised all the Federal
Government's civil and international litigation. He
told a young Justice Department lawyer years later
that he would have been content to continue running
the Civil Division for the rest of his career.
One of his assignments was somewhat unusual
for the Civil Division chief. He agreed to argue a case
in the Supreme Court, usually the task of the Solicitor
General's Office. The case involved a Yale University
professor of medicine, John F. Peters, who had been
discharged on loyalty grounds from his job as a
part-time Federal health consultant.
The Solicitor General, Simon E. Soboloff,
disagreed with the Government's position that the
action by the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty
Review Board was valid and refused to sign the brief
or argue the case. Mr. Burger argued on behalf of the
board and lost Among the lawyers who filed briefs on
the professor's behalf were two who would precede
Mr. Burger on the Supreme Court, Abe Fortas and
Arthur J. Goldberg.
After two years, Mr. Burger resigned from the
Justice Department, and he was preparing to return to
private practice in St. Paul when Judge Harold
Stephens of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit died. President
Eisenhower nominated him for the vacancy, and he
joined the court in 1956.
His elevation to the Supreme Court 13 years later
was made possible by President Lyndon B. Johnson's
failure to persuade the Senate to accept Abe Fortas as
Chief Justice.
A BENEFICIARY OF THE 1968 ELECTION
On June 13, 1968, Earl Warren had announced
his intention to resign after 15 years as Chief Justice.
President Johnson nominated Mr. Fortas, then an
Associate Justice, as Chief Justice. But the nomination
became a victim of the 1968 Presidential election
campaign and was withdrawn on Oct. 2, the fourth
day of a Senate filibuster that followed acrimonious
confirmation hearings.
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Chief Justice Warren agreed to delay his of Washington, and two grandchildren. Funeral
retirement, and it was clear that whoever won the arrangements were incomplete today.
Presidential election would choose the next Chief
Justice. Justice Fortas remained on the Court until
May 1969, when he resigned after the disclosure that
he had accepted a $20,000 fee from a foundation
controlled by Louis E. Wolfson, a friend and former
client who was under Federal investigation for
violating securities laws.
On May 21, a week after the Fortas resignation,
President Nixon nominated Mr. Burger to be Chief
Justice. The nomination went smoothly in the Senate,
and he was sworn in as Chief Justice on June 23,
1969.
The Chief Justice and his wife lived in a
renovated pre-Civil War farmhouse on several acres
in McLean, Va. According to the annual financial
disclosure statements required of all Federal judges,
he had assets of more than $1 million. His largest
investment was the common stock of the Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Company.
He was a gardener and a serious wine enthusiast
who took pride in his wine cellar and occasionally
sponsored wine-tasting dinners at the Supreme Court.
By statute, the Chief Justice is Chancellor of the
Smithsonian Institution and chairman of the board of
trustees of the National Gallery of Art, duties that, as
an art and history buff he enjoyed. He visited antiques
stores to look for good pieces for the Court and took
an active role in the Supreme Court Historical Society.
He and his wife led an active social life in
Washington and spent part of nearly every summer in
Europe, usually in connection with a conference or
other official appearance.
Chief Justice Burger cut an imposing figure, and
it was often said that he looked like Hollywood's
image of a Chief Justice. He was nearly six feet tall,
stocky but not heavy, with regular features, a square
jaw and silvery hair.
Proper appearance was important to him. He once
sent a note to the Solicitor General's Office
complaining that a Deputy Solicitor General had worn
a vest the wrong shade of gray with the formal
morning attire required of Government lawyers who
argue before the Court.
In 1976, he appeared at a Bicentennial
commemoration in a billowing robe with scarlet trim,
a reproduction of the robe worn by the first Chief
Justice, John Jay. He later put the robe on display in
the Court's exhibit area.
A book by Chief Justice Burger, "It Is So
Ordered" (William Morrow), was published earlier
this year. It is an account of 14 cases that helped
shaped the interpretation of the Constitution.
Mr. Burger's wife died in May 1994. He is
survived by his son, of Arlington, Va.; his daughter,
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BURGER'S TENURE TINGED WITH IRONY
Despite Conservative Views, His Court Expanded Many Rights
Atlanta Constitution Monday, June 26, 1995
Aaron Epstein
Knight-Ridder Newspapers
Washington - Warren Earl Burger, whose chiseled
features and formidable mane of white hair made him
the very model of an idealized chief justice, may be
best remembered for leading the counterrevolution that
wasn't.
Burger, a conservative jurist who died Sunday at
the age of 87 of congestive heart failure, and his
colleagues on the Burger court were widely expected
to roll back the liberal doctrines of the Warren court
that preceded them. Instead, during Burger's 17-year
tenure as chiefjustice, from 1969 to 1986, the Warren
court legacy survived. In fact, it thrived.
"It's always been somewhat comforting to know,"
Burger said shortly after his retirement, "that I have
been castigated by so-called liberals for being too
conservative and castigated by so-called conservatives
for being too liberal. Pretty safe position to be in."
Critics in the media frequently referred to the
Burger court as rootless, leaderless, rudderless,
fragmented, unpredictable, an enigma, and nine
justices in search of a theme.
"That's what freedom of the press is for - the
freedom to make damn fool statements," Burger
replied in a post-retirement interview.
NAMED BY NIXON
Nominated to the court by President Richard
Nixon, Burger himself was described by many who
knew him as pompous, insecure, somewhat paranoid,
overbearing, manipulative, distrusted by his
colleagues and lacking in intellect.
Indeed, Gerald Gunther, a respected professor of
constitutional law at Stanford University, once
predicted that Burger would be seen by historians as
"a well-meaning, genial-seeming fellow" who was
more interested in the administrative and ceremonial
side of the court than in its decision-making
functions."
"I could compile an anthology of opinions that the
chief justice signed over those 17 years which
contained passages that he had not adequately thought
out," Gunther said in 1986.
Yet many of his former law clerks remembered
him as kind, thoughtful, charming and humorous.
They said his most lasting contribution may be his
leadership in modernizing the federal judiciary.
While Burger occupied the court's center seat, the
towering landmarks of the Warren court - school
desegregation, the one-person, one-vote principle in
elections, the right of privacy, broadened rights of free
speech and press, and Miranda warnings and other fair
play requirements imposed on the police - remained
intact.
In fact, the Burger court expanded most of those
principles.
MINORITY RIGHTS A FOCUS
It approved busing as a remedy for racial
segregation in the public schools and applied
principles of desegregation to cities in the North.
It permitted job and school preferences for racial
minorities as a cure for past discrimination.
It expanded the right to privacy to give women
the unfettered right to choose abortion during the early
stages of pregnancy and gave women some
constitutional protection against gender
discrimination.
It insisted that the press could not be forced to
publish replies to its articles and had a constitutional
right to attend court proceedings in criminal cases.
And it helped define the bounds of presidential
power, forcing Nixon to turn over the crucial
Watergate tapes to prosecutors and, in the Pentagon
Papers case, denying him the authority to prevent the
publication of classified information.
Only in criminal cases did the Burger court
accomplish some consistent remodeling. It expanded
the power of the police to search vehicles, open fields
and mobile homes, to stop passengers at airports, to
question workers at factory gates and to detain
travelerssuspectd of smuggling drugs across U.S.
borders.
When police officers or prosecutors violated the
rules, the Burger court found ways to allow illegally
obtained evidence to be used or permit convictions to
stand.
BICENTENNIAL LEGACY
Born in St. Paul, Minn., to a family descended
from Swiss and German immigrants, Burger earned
his undergraduate degree at night from the University
of Minnesota while working days as an insurance
salesman. After earning a law degree at night at St.
Paul College of Law, Burger joined a Minneapolis
law firm and began dabbling in politics.
He managed Harold Stassen's campaign to be the
governor of Minnesota and supported Dwight D.
Eisenhower's presidential candidacy at the 1952
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Republican National Convention. After serving as an
assistant attorney general in Eisenhower's
administration, Burger was named by Eisenhower in
1956 to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, where he served until Nixon
nominated him to be chief justice of the Supreme
Court in 1969.
After his retirement from the Supreme Court in
1986, Burger worked as unpaid chairman of the
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, organizing the celebrations of the
Constitution's 200th anniversary in 1987 and the Bill
of Rights' 200th anniversary in 1989.
In recent years, Burger had been in declining
health, suffering from recurring pulmonary problems.
He was hospitalized several times with pneumonia.
He died at Washington's Sibley Memorial Hospital.
Burger's wife of 61 years, Elvera, died last year.
They had a son, Wade, and a daughter, Margaret, and
two grandchildren.
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FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN BURGER DIES AT 87
Conservative Nixon Appointee's Court Was Surprisingly Liberal
Clinton Hails Jurist's 'Tireless Service'
Los Angeles Times
Copyright, Los Angeles Times 1995
Monday, June 26, 1995
David G. Savage
Times Staff Writer
Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, a
conservative jurist who for 17 years led a fractured
and at times surprisingly liberal Supreme Court, died
Sunday. He was 87.
Burger died of congestive heart failure following
a lengthy illness. He served from 1969 to 1985-the
longest tenure this century-as the nation's 15th chief
justice.
President Clinton praised Burger as a visionary
chiefjustice. "His expansive view of the Constitution
and his tireless service will leave a lasting imprint on
the court and our nation," Clinton said in a statement
from Little Rock, Ark.
Though the late chief justice was appointed as a
law-and-order judge, the "Burger court" of the 1970s
and early 1980s is best remembered for rulings that
established a woman's right to abortion, ordered
cross-town busing for school desegregation, outlawed
sex discrimination by the government, upheld
affirmative action for minorities and-at least for a
time-struck down the death penalty.
Those rulings did not always reflect Burger's
views. In the court's private conferences, he told his
colleagues that he favored overruling such precedents
as Miranda vs. Arizona, which required the police to
warn suspects of their rights, and the so-called
exclusionary rule, which required that illegally
obtained evidence be excluded from a trial.
But despite his persistent efforts- Burger was
unable to muster a majority for his opinions. In a
series of rulings on criminal justice, the court trimmed
around the edges on matters such as search and
seizure and police identifications but stopped short of
overturning any of the liberal precedents of the Earl
Warren court.
Faced with colleagues whose views were more
liberal than his, Burger often found himself reluctantly
joining court rulings and then writing concurring
opinions that put a more moderate spin on the
outcome.
In Roe vs. Wade, for example, Burger voted with
the 7-2 majority in 1973 to strike down a Texas law
that made abortion a crime, and he added a separate
opinion stating that "abortion on demand" was not
required. Nonetheless, later rulings made clear that
abortion on demand was the law, at least until the
third trimester of pregnancy.
Burger was a conservative member of the
influential U.S. Court of Appeals during the 1960s,
during the high court's most liberal period. In several
speeches and articles at that time, Burger decried the
willingness of liberals to elevate the rights of criminal
defendants. He also fretted about the breakdown of
law and order in the cities and called for a more
"reasonable balance" between government authority
and the rights of the individual.
"We know that a nation or a community which
has no rules and no laws is not a society but an
anarchy in which no rights, either individual or
collective, can survive," Burger said in one speech.
Burger was not alone in expressing those views.
His words caught the attention of Richard Nixon, who
was voicing similar themes throughout his campaign
for the presidency in 1968.
Nixon promised a shake-up of the high court and
a return to law and order if elected. In one of his first
moves after he took office, Nixon selected Burger to
fill the vacancy left by retiring Chief Justice Earl
Warren in 1969.
Three other Nixon appointees soon followed, and
most experts predicted a sharp turn to the right by the
court. But it never quite happened then.
In 1983, a group of law professors aptly summed
up the prevailing view of his court in a book titled
"The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That
Wasn't."
During his 17 years as chief justice, Burger
served under four presidents and he twice played a key
role in the Watergate scandal as the drama unfolded in
the summer of 1974.
Facing impeachment and criminal investigation,
President Nixon appealed to the high court to block a
subpoena demanding that he turn over disputed Oval
Office tape recordings. The embattled chief executive
rested his hopes on Burger, his first court nominee.
But the chiefjustice spoke for a unanimous court,
ruling that Nixon could not invoke "executive
privilege" to obstruct a criminal inquiry. No
person-including the President-is above the law, the
court said.
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His last appeal exhausted, Nixon finally yielded
the tapes that demonstrated his role in leading the
cover-up of the Watergate affair. Two weeks later, he
resigned.
Burger was attending a conference in the
Netherlands when word came that Nixon would leave
office the next day. Shortly afterward, Vice President
Gerald R. Ford reached him on the phone.
"Mr. Chief Justice, I hate to interrupt your trip,
but I would like it very much if you could be here for
the swearing-in," Ford said.
Burger said he would gladly preside at the
ceremony, even though he faced an all-night flight to
Washington. "I've got to be there. And I want to be
there," he told Ford.
At noon on Aug. 9, 1974, one President officially
resigned and another took over, but the unprecedented
ceremony had at least one familiar feature as the chief
justice read Ford the oath of office.
No one questioned that Burger was well suited for
his ceremonial role as leader of the nation's judiciary.
He had flowing white hair, a sharp chin and a baritone
voice, and he took great pride in the dignity of his
office. He often noted that he was not only the chief
judge of the Supreme Court but had held the office of
chief justice of the United States for longer than any
person in this century.
Nor did anyone doubt that Burger reveled in the
role. For many years in Washington, even after he
stepped down, he could be seen riding through town
in the back of a long government limousine whose
license plate read: "CJ 15."
But Burger had a rocky relationship with several
of his independent-minded colleagues, who found him
to be pompous and petty. Justice Potter Stewart once
derided him as the "show captain" of the court, and the
sunny-sided William J. Brennan dismissed him as a
"dummy" in front of his clerks. Even his boyhood
friend Harry A. Blackmun came to despise Burger,
noting that he himself was in the "chiefs doghouse"
because he had voted the wrong way in one case.
The 1979 book "The Brethren" by Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong dealt Burger's
reputation a further blow by recounting stories that
portrayed him as arrogant and officious.
But many others, including former clerks and
court employees, said that these portraits were unfair
and misleading. They said that Burger was courteous
and kind, even if a bit shy and withdrawn. Several of
the justices who disagreed with Burger on legal
matters found themselves taken aback by Burger's
generosity when they or a family member fell ill.
"We can disagree like hell," one justice told a
reporter, "but he can be so kind and gracious too."
Burger had a special interest in history and often
lectured on the nation's founders and their view of the
role for the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, as the
200th anniversary of the U.S. Constitution
approached, Burger agreed to lead a commission set
up to promote its celebration. In 1986, distressed that
the bicentennial celebration was behind schedule,
Burger made a decision that surprised nearly everyone
in Washington, including the White House.
In late May, he made an appointment to see
President Ronald Reagan for a brief chat about the
bicentennial. Burger droned on for several minutes,
and the President seemed to be paying little attention.
But all ears perked up when Burger commented that
he planned to devote fill time to the task of running
the bicentennial commission. At age 79, he said he
was ready to leave the duties of the court.
Burger's decision was kept a closely held secret in
the White House. Three weeks later, Reagan walked
into the pressroom and, to the amazement of official
Washington, announced that the chief justice was
retiring, and that Justice William H. Rehnquist would
take his place. After 17 years, the Burger court had
come to an end.
"Warren presided with great distinction over
some of the most significant decisions in the court's
history," said William P. Rogers, secretary of state
under Nixon and attorney general in the Dwight D.
Eisenhower Administration. "With the passage of
time, his great contribution to the history of our nation
will be more and more understood and appreciated."
Warren Earl Burger had come a long way. He was
born Sept. 17, 1907, in St. Paul, Minn., and spent
much of his youth on the 20-acre truck farm that his
family owned on the outskirts of the city. In high
school, he was president of the student council and
editor of the school paper. He won letters in football,
hockey, swimming and track and field. Upon
graduation, he sold life insurance for six years while
attending the University of Minnesota and the St. Paul
College of Law at night.
As a young lawyer, Burger became active in
Republican politics and worked for the election of
Gov. Harold E. Stassen. In 1948, when Stassen ran
for the presidency, Burger directed his campaign.
While the Minnesota governor failed to win the
Republican nomination, his campaign manager made
a series of key contacts, including Herbert Brownell,
later to become President Eisenhower's attorney
general.
Four years later, Burger was back at the
Republican National Convention as the floor manager
for Stassen. At a key moment, he threw the Minnesota
delegation's support to Eisenhower, clinching his
nomination on the first ballot.
Brownell brought Burger to Washington and
made him head of the Justice Department's civil
division. In 1956, Eisenhower appointed Burger to a
judgeship on the influential U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.
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Burger did not fit the pattern of most men who
were elevated to the Supreme Court. He did not come
from a prominent family and was not wealthy. He had
not graduated from a prestigious law school and he
had neither worked for a well-known law firm nor
held high political office.
But like Nixon, he had worked his way up from
humble beginnings. And he espoused a solid,
common-sense conservatism. On May 21, 1969,
Nixon introduced Burger as his choice to head the
Supreme Court.
The veteran justices, some of whom such as Hugo
Black and William 0. Douglas had been on the bench
since the 1930s, were miffed by the temerity of the
new chief justice.
"He took our conference room as his office, and
without consulting us," Douglas complained. Burger
also passed on word that he had spoken to the FBI
and that its officials were concerned that the justices
could be kidnaped by foreign agents and held for
ransom.
"Tell the FBI that the kidnapers should pick out
a judge that Nixon wants back," replied Douglas, a
strident liberal who had clashed with Nixon.
Off the bench, Burger kept up a busy schedule.
He headed the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policy-making body for the federal courts;
chaired the board of the Federal Judicial Center, the
research and training arm of the judicial system, and
helped supervise the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, which oversees the administration of the
courts.
He constantly lobbied Congress for more funding
for the courts, and even the critics of his legal rulings
praised him for helping to bring the federal courts into
the modem era with computers and better case
management.
But Burger firmly resisted other modernisms such
as television and advertising. In 1981, he pushed and
punched at a television cameraman who had followed
him toward an elevator. During his time as head of the
judiciary, he adamantly refused to allow cameras in
the federal courts.
Almost without fail, an American Bar Assn.
convention was not complete without a speech from
Burger denouncing lawyers who advertised their
services. This and other developments cheapened an
honorable profession, Burger complained.
Burger is survived by a son, Wade, and a
daughter, Margaret, and two grandchildren. His wife
of 61 years, Elvera, died last year. Funeral
arrangements are pending.
Times staff writer Glenn F. Bunting contributed to
this story.
FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER DEAD AT 87
Born: Sept. 17, 1907, in St. Paul, Minn.
Educated: University of Minnesota, undergraduate, St.
Paul College of Law
1931: Joined Minneapolis law firm
1939: Managed the gubernatorial campaign of a
young Harold Stassen
1956: Named by President Eisenhower to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
1969 to 1986: Served as chief justice of the United
States
* Legally defined obscenity
* Established busing as a tool to end
segregation
* Forced President Nixon to release Watergate
tapes
* Led the national celebrations of the
Constitution's 200th anniversary in 1987 and
the Bill of Rights' 200th anniversary in 1989
* Upheld affirmative action
* Established right to abortion
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THE 'CHIEF' I KNEW
Warren Burger Creative, Witty
Orlando Sentinel, Tuesday, June 27, 1995
Tait Trussell
Special To The Sentinel
To those who knew him intimately, former Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger was anything but the
pompous and starchy recluse so often depicted in the
press.
Instead, Burger, who died Sunday of heart failure
at age 87, was often charming, creative and gifted,
with an off-beat sense of humor little known to the
public.
At 79, Burger was chosen by President Reagan to
head the Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S.
Constitution. He resigned from the high court to
devote his last active years to the commemoration of
the signing of the Constitution and eventual
ratification of the Bill of Rights.
No more appropriate choice could have been
found to educate the American public about the rights
and responsibilities provided in our governing
document. Burger's birthday was Sept. 17. It was on
Sept. 17, 1787, that our Constitution was born in
Philadelphia.
More important, no one could have loved and
respected the Constitution more. A strict
constitutionalist in his court opinions, Burger was a
student of the nation's early history and could quote
the Framers of the Constitution as a preacher quotes
the Scriptures.
With his strong features, white mane and resonant
voice, the "Chief' - as those who knew him well called
him - was an imposing figure who became the
embodiment of the commemoration - from 1986
through 1991 when the 200th anniversary of the Bill
of Rights was marked.
"I think it's very thoughtful of the country to
celebrate my birthday this way," he joked to friends, as
momentous festivities were building toward the Sept.
17 celebration of the Constitution's signing.
If Burger seemed stem and impatient at times, it
could be attributed to a nearly constant back pain. He
was stricken with polio as a youngster. He wore a
back brace and took electronic acupuncture treatments
to abate the persistent and often excruciating pain. But
pain didn't stop him from putting in 80-hour
workweeks, educating the public about the
Constitution.
During his years as chairman of the Bicentennial
Commission, he logged tens of thousands of miles,
delivered hundreds of speeches (typically without a
text or even notes), held scores of interviews with the
press and came up with most of the novel ideas of
promoting the five-year celebration.
After a typically demanding week, his weary
chauffeur confided to a chum, "If he was human, he
would have worked himself to death long ago."
Burger cracked once that his wife said, "Warren,
can't we get your old job back?"
One afternoon as the Chief was about to leave his
hotel room to address several thousand elementary-
school principals assembled at the convention hall in
Orlando, I stepped aside to let him lead the way
through the door.
"You go ahead," he told me in mock
apprehension, "in case there are any terrorists out
there."
His lifelong absorption with the abstraction of the
law didn't suppress his creative bent. While on the
U.S. Court of Appeals, he drew precise sketches of
witnesses and sculpted the heads of several of his
colleagues. His cast of the head of Benjamin Franklin
was so skillfully done that the Franklin Mint
reproduced it and sold it as a memento of the
Constitutional period.
One day, while I was riding with the Chief in his
limousine, he was speaking of an upcoming trip to
England tied to the commemorative activities. I
mentioned that I could join him.
"No, Tait," he said earnestly. "I'm taking Mrs.
Burger and Zsa Zsa Gabor."
At the 200th birthday celebration in Philadelphia,
the Chief and half a dozen youngsters rang a replica of
the Liberty Bell to signify the hour of signing of the
Constitution. After several hearty tugs on the rope, he
turned to an aide and said, "Now I'm turning this over
to the children, because the future of the Constitution
is in their hands."
Tait 'Trussell of Mount Dora was director of
communications for the Bicentennial Commission
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EXCERPTS FROM SUPREME COURT OPINIONS WRITTEN BY THE LATE
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN E. BURGER
The Associated Press
Copyright 1995. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.
Sunday, June 25, 1995
From Lemon vs. Kurtzman in 1971:
The language of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment is at best opaque, particularly when
compared with other portions of the amendment.
Its authors did not simply prohibit the
establishment of a state church or a state religion,
an area history shows they regarded as very
important and fraught with great dangers.
The Constitution decrees that religion must be a
private matter for the individual, the family and
the institutions of private choice, and that while
some involvement and entanglement are
inevitable, lines must be drawn.
Every analysis in this area must begin with
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed
by the court over many years. Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.
From Lynch vs. Donnelly in 1984:
We granted (review) to decide whether the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
prohibits a municipality from including a creche,
or Nativity scene, in its annual Christmas display.
The Pawtucket (R.I.) display comprises many of
the figures and decorations traditionally
associated with Christmas, including among other
things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling
Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas
tree, carolers ... and the creche at issue here.
There is an unbroken history of official
acknowledgement by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American
life from at least 1789. We hold that,
notwithstanding the religious significance of the
creche, the city of Pawtucket has not violated the
Establishment Clause.
From Nixon vs. Williams in 1984:
We are now urged to adopt and apply the
so-called ultimate or inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule.
If the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
informative ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means . . . then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the
evidence should be received. Anything less would
reject logic, experience and common sense.
From Swann vs. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education in 1971:
Nearly 17 years ago this court held, in explicit
terms, that state-imposed segregation by race in
public schools denies equal protection of the
laws. At no time has the court deviated in the
slightest degree from that holding or its
constitutional underpinnings.
The central issue in this case is that of student
assignment and. . what the limits are, if any, on
the use of transportation facilities to correct
state-enforced racial school segregation.... Bus
transportation has been an integral part of the
public education system for years. . . The
remedial techniques used in the district court's
order were within the court's power to provide
equitable relief
From Reed vs. Reed in 1971:
The probate court implicitly recognized the
equality of entitlement of the two applicants , .
and noted that neither of the applicants was under
any legal disability-, the court ruled, however, that
appellee, being a male, was to be preferred to the
female appellant.
To give a mandatory preference to members of
either sex over members of the other, merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. By
providing dissimilar treatment for men and
women who are thus similarly situated, the
challenged (law) violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
From U.S. vs. Nixon in 1974:
In this case the president challenges a subpoena
served on him as a third party requiring the
13
production of materials (White House tape
recordings) for use in a criminal prosecution; he
does so on the claim he has a privilege against
disclosure of confidential communications.
Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any
explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality,
yet to the extent this interest relates to the
effective discharge of a president's powers, it is
constitutionally based.
The right to the production of all evidence at a
criminal trial similarly has constitutional
dimensions. We conclude that when the ground
for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice.
From Richmond Newspapers vs. Virginia in 1980:
The narrow question ... is whether the right of
the public and press to attend criminal trials is
guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
The historical evidence demonstrates conclusively
that at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open. This is no
quirk of history; rather, it has long been
recognized as an indispensable attribute of an
Anglo-American trial.
People in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is
difficult for them to accept what they are
prohibited from observing.
We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is
implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries,
important aspects of freedom of speech and of the
press could be eviscerated.
From Miller vs. California in 1973:
State statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be
(a) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
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JUSTICE SOUTER EMERGES
The New York Times
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
September 25, 1994, Sunday
David J. Garrow
No public document - and probably only a single
very private one - marks April 23, 1992, as one of the
more momentous days in recent Supreme Court
history. Nothing of apparent note transpired at the
Court that Thursday; oral arguments had taken place
the day before and the Justices' weekly private
conference, where they vote on cases, would not begin
until Friday morning.
In his chambers on the far southeastern corner of
the main floor, the Court's then-second-newest Justice
spent the day in contemplation, pondering one of
Wednesday's cases. A large portrait of Harlan Fiske
Stone, a New Hampshire-born Republican Justice
later named Chief Justice by a Democratic President,
dominated the room. Many visitors would note that
the office, unlike those of other Justices, had no
computer terminal; only a few -- particularly those
visiting toward dusk - would realize that the office
also had not a single electric desk lamp.
Only late in the day did the Justice reach a firm
conclusion. Even though this was the case of the year,
and perhaps of the decade, as of the day before, he had
not -just as he had told the United States Senate and
the American people almost two years earlier --
decided what he would do. On Wednesday, during
oral argument of the case, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, he had listened
intently from his seat on the bench as Planned
Parenthood's attorney, Kathryn Kolbert, began her
argument:
"Whether our Constitution endows government
with the power to force a woman to continue or to
end a pregnancy against her will is the central
question in this case.
"Since this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, a
generation of American women have come of age
secure in the knowledge that the Constitution
provides the highest level of protection for their
childbearing decisions.
"This landmark decision, which necessarily and
logically flows from a century of this Court's
jurisprudence, not only protects rights of bodily
integrity and autonomy but has enabled millions
of women to participate fully and equally in
society."
But now Roe's survival was very much in doubt,
as was starkly revealed by the Pennsylvania
anti-abortion regulations under review in Casey. Three
years earlier, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justices Byron R. White, Antonin Scalia and Anthony
M. Kennedy had signaled their desire to overrule Roe
at the first available opportunity, and few observers
doubted that the Court's newest and most
controversial member, Clarence Thomas, was eager to
join them as the fifth and decisive vote.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who three years
earlier had infuriated Scalia by refusing to provide a
fifth vote to jettison Roe, interrupted Kolbert with the
hour's first question, and she was soon followed by
Scalia, Kennedy and Rehnquist.
Pennsylvania's attorney general, Ernest D. Preate
Jr., representing Gov. Robert P. Casey, followed
Kolbert to the lecturn, but almost before he could
begin, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the 82-year-old
author of the Court's landmark 1973 abortion
decision, asked whether Preate had even read Roe.
Then O'Connor peppered Preate with a series of
skeptical questions, followed by John Paul Stevens, a
firm supporter of Roe, and even by Anthony Kennedy,
before Scalia jumped in to provide some cover.
Only as Preate's time was about to expire did the
52-year-old David Hackett Souter speak up to ask
Preate a statistical question about the Pennsylvania
provision that would require married women facing
unwanted pregnancies to notify their husbands, even
if they were separated or estranged, before seeking an
abortion. Then, after United States Solicitor General
Kenneth W. Starr, representing the anti-abortion
views of the Bush Administration, succeeded Preate to
second the attack on Roe, Souter pressed Starr to
concede that if his position prevailed, states could
outlaw all abortions except perhaps those where a
pregnancy directly threatened a woman's life.
None of Souter's comments had telegraphed a
clear position on either Casey or Roe. Had any
abortion-rights activists been inclined to interpret his
exchange with Starr as promising, they had only to
remember how Souter's encouraging comments from
the bench 18 months earlier in the abortion "gag rule"
case of Rust v. Sullivan had proved utterly
misleading. Souter had joined Rehnquist, White,
Scalia and Kennedy in a 5-4 decision upholding
statutory restrictions on what doctors in federally
financed clinics could say to female patients.
Not for many years will any outsiders likely see
any notes that may have been taken that following
Friday morning when the Justices met to vote on
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. But while seven
Justices indicated that they would uphold most of the
Pennsylvania restrictions, only four - Rehnquist,
White, Scalia and Thomas -- wanted to explicitly
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vitiate Roe. O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, however,
all believed the restrictions could be upheld at the
same time that Roe was left standing. While
Rehnquist himself undertook the drafting of Casey's
apparent majority opinion, Kennedy's surprising
stance gave Souter and O'Connor the opening toward
an intermediate outcome for which they had been
hoping.
Well before Rehnquist's opinion was circulated to
other Justices in late May, Kennedy privately joined
Souter and O'Connor in preparing an extensive
separate statement. Sometimes all three Justices,
sitting on the couch in Souter's office, would jointly
review their progress, and their cooperation led to a
stunningly unexpected result: Rather than Rehnquist
and Scalia having five votes to void Roe, there were
five votes - Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy, plus
Blackmun and Stevens, to uphold Roe.
In early June, Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy
distributed to their colleagues initial copies of their
joint opinion. As David Savage later wrote in The Los
Angeles Times: "Rehnquist and Scalia were stunned.
So, too, was Blackmun." And so, on Monday
morning, June 29, 1992, the final day of the term,
commentators were unprepared for the result in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Not since the famous
1958 Little Rock school desegregation case of Cooper
v. Aaron, when all nine Justices signed a ringing
reaffirmation of Brown v. Board of Education, had
any Supreme Court opinion been presented to the
American people as formally authored by more than
one Justice. But now, symbolically invoking the
powerful precedent of Cooper, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter issued their plurality decision in
Casey as an explicit trio opinion.
"[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should
be retained and once again affirmed," they wrote in
language that also spoke for Blackmun and Stevens.
"Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm,
has three parts. First is a recognition of the right
of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State. . . . Second is a
confirmation of the State's power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a
woman's life or health. And third is the principle
that the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of
the woman and the life of the fetus that may
become a child. These principles do not
contradict one another; and we adhere to each."
When announcing decisions from the bench,
Justices usually offer a summary or read brief
excerpts. On this morning, however, each of the three
-- first O'Connor, then Kennedy and finally Souter -
orally delivered major portions of the trio opinion.
Journalists quickly realized they were witnessing an
unprecedented event.
The most eloquent section of the opinion was the
discussion of Roe and the principle of stare decisis -
Latin for judicial respect of existing precedent -- that
had been crafted principally by David Souter. Souter's
words in Casey spoke not only for the Court, but also
for the essence of America's judicial heritage and for
the very core of Souter's own judicial background.
That background had not been fully understood by the
commentators and Senators who had debated what his
1990 nomination meant for the future of Roe and
other fundamental rights. If they had, what was now
happening in Casey would not have come as a
surprise.
Souter's analysis reflected a realism not always
found in high court pronouncements:
"For two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in
reliance on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail. The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by
their ability to control their reproductive lives."
Then Souter moved to the core of his argument,
two paragraphs that rank among the most memorable
lines ever authored by an American jurist:
"Where, in the performance of its judicial
duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as
to resolve the sort of intensely divisive
controversy reflected in Roe and those rare,
comparable cases, its decision has a dimension
that the resolution of the normal case does not
carry. It is the dimension present whenever the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the
contending sides of a national controversy to end
their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.
'"The Court is not asked to do this very often,
having thus addressed the Nation only twice in
our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe.
But when the Court does act in this way, its
decision requires an equally rare precedential
force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn
it and to thwart its implementation. Some of those
efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional
reactions; others may proceed from principles
worthy of profound respect. But whatever the
premises of opposition may be, only the most
convincing justification under accepted standards
of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a
later decision overruling the first was anything
but a surrender to political pressure, and an
unjustified repudiation of the principle on which
the Court staked its authority in the first instance.
So to overrule under fire in the absence of the
most compelling reason to re-examine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court's
legitimacy beyond any serious question."
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Souter closed by reiterating that Casey, and Roe,
were about far more than simply abortion:
"A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding
under the existing circumstances would address
error, if error there was, at the cost of both
profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's
legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the
rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to
the essence of Roe's original decision, and we do
so today."
Harry Blackmun's concurrence accurately termed
the Souter-O'Connor-Kennedy joint opinion "an act of
personal courage and constitutional principle," and
Blackmun added that "what has happened today
should serve as a model for future Justices and a
warning to all who have tried to turn this Court into
yet another political branch."
Casey was a watershed event in American history,
the most institutionally significant decision for the
Court since Brown. Although some abortion-rights
activists failed to acknowledge their victory, expert
observers like Laurence H. Tribe, the Harvard law
professor, emphasized that the trio opinion "puts the
right to abortion on a firmer jurisprudential foundation
than ever before."
But the significance of Casey lay not just in its
constitutional resolution of the 20-year battle over
Roe, nor in its long-term importance to the Court's
own institutional reputation; Casey also signaled the
unexpected failure of the right-wing judicial
counterrevolution that the Reagan and Bush
Administrations had hoped to bring about by naming
staunch conservatives to the Federal bench.
After Casey, hard-right commentators like the
columnist Robert Novak unleashed vituperative
assaults on the trio of Republican Justices who had
redeemed Roe, particularly the Roman Catholic
Justice Kennedy. Gary L. McDowell, a Reagan Justice
Department aide who had helped former Attorney
General Edwin Meese articulate his harsh
cenuncianons of reaeral juages, lamentea now au
that had been so vigorously fought for by Reagan and
Bush, all that had been achieved, was suddenly lost."
But there is one other remarkable thing about
Casey, both in the context of today's uncertainty about
where the Court is heading and in the context of
1990's debate over how 'stealth nominee" David
Souter would vote on Roe: namely that it is
impossible to find anyone who has long known Souter
who was surprised by his resolution of Casey. How
could something so obvious to those who know Souter
best have eluded 1990's army of politicians and
prognosticators? In that seeming puzzle lies the rich
story of a humble yet utterly self-confident man who,
far from being an odd recluse from another age,
possesses both exceptional intelligence and a warm
circle of friends.
David Hackett Souter, the only child of a quiet
bank officer and an equally reserved homemaker, was
born in Melrose, Mass., on Sept. 17, 1939; in 1950,
the Souters moved to an old family homestead in the
rural village of East Weare, N.H., a few miles west of
Concord. Souter's father worked at a Concord bank.
Weare was too small to have its own secondary school
so David commuted to Concord High School, from
which he graduated in 1957 and won admission to
Harvard.
Following Harvard, Souter received a two-year
Rhodes scholarship to Magdalen College at Oxford,
where he completed a bachelor's degree in
jurisprudence before entering Harvard Law School in
1963. Upon graduation in 1966, he happily returned
home to New Hampshire to take an entry-level
position with the well-respected Concord firm of Orr
& Reno.
Law-office work gave Souter few opportunities
for courtroom experience, and in late 1968 he eagerly
enlisted as one of about 20 state assistant attorneys
general. His first few years in the Attorney General's
office were devoted more to criminal than to civil
cases, but the most important development in Souter's
young career came in 1970 when Gov. Walter
Peterson of New Hampshire named Warren Rudman,
previously his own legal counsel, to a five-year term
as the state's new Attorney General.
Rudman quickly came to appreciate Souter as a
"lawyer's lawyer" and within a few months named
Souter his deputy. A gregarious politician, Rudman
delegated much of the running of the office to Souter.
Rudman's own mentor, Governor Peterson, was
defeated for re-election in the 1972 Republican
primary by Meldrim Thomson, an unpredictable
conservative. Thomson's victory set off a decade-long
ideological battle among New Hampshire
Republicans, and although Rudman and Thomson
quickly reached a grudging accommodation, one of
Souter's main responsibilities was to insure the utmost
professionalism in the office. As Souter explained to
one young lawyer joining the staff "We dont win
cases. We don't lose cases. We try cases."
In 1976, with Rudman's term as Attorney General
expiring, Rudman convinced Thomson to name Souter
as his successor. Souter responded to the appointment
by stressing that "the legal issues I feel most strongly
about are not political ones." When reporters asked if
he viewed the Attorney General's job as a
steppingstone to ajudgeship, Souter replied, "I'd have
to decide if I were temperamentally suited to it."
As Attorney General, Souter named another
Rudman protege, Thomas D. Rath, as his own deputy.
The new post gave the 36-year-old Souter some public
visibility, asked to deliver the commencement address
at a small college, he reminded the graduates that "our
whole constitutional history is a history of restraining
power." However, when the idea was raised that the
Attorney General's post be made elective rather than
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appointive, Souter termed the suggestion so
"abominable" that "it sounds like something proposed
by John Mitchell," Richard Nixon's convicted former
campaign chairman and Attorney General.
Souter maintained a polite distance from
Governor Thomson but, as the state's top law
enforcement official, nonetheless was drawn into
various controversies. When antinuclear
demonstrators descended upon a partly constructed
power plant at Seabrook on the New Hampshire coast,
Souter took the lead in overseeing their arrests and
prosecution. When legalized casino gambling was
proposed for New Hampshire, Souter spoke out
forcefully in opposition and later termed his successful
effort "my greatest crusade."
Souter was popular with his staff, both because of
the glowing professional reputation his and Rudman's
appointments had won for the office and because of
his friendly humility and wry humor. Outside the
office, Souter - who was living with his
now-widowed mother in Weare -- pursued hiking and
mountain climbing. His long walks around Weare
expanded to serious treks up New Hampshire's
Presidential peaks.
Early in 1978, Governor Thomson sought to fill
a vacancy on the five-member New Hampshire
Supreme Court with former Congressman Louis C.
Wyman, but the Executive Council, the Colonial-era
body charged with ratifying judicial nominations,
declined to approve Wyman and several councilors
suggested naming Souter to the seat. Thomson
resisted and, seeking to eliminate Souter as an
alternative to Wyman, offered instead to nominate
Souter to a newly authorized judgeship on the
Superior Court trial bench.
Faced with the choice, Souter hesitated. Thomson
was not going to name him to the high court, and
under longtime New Hampshire norms, almost every
Justice appointed to the Supreme Court had been
promoted from Superior Court. Souter could remain
Attorney General for another two and a half years. but
there was no reason to believe that whoever might be
governor in 1980 would offer him a judgeship. With
some ambivalence about becoming a trial judge
simply as a steppingstone to an appellate post, Souter
accepted Thomson's offer to nominate him and name
his close friend Tom Rath his successor.
Souter's ascension to Superior Court also marked
other milestones. First, his departure as Attorney
General allowed him to begin dating a female lawyer
in the office, Ann Cagwin. His romantic interest in
Cagwin, his closest friends attest, was the most
serious attachment of his life. No American is more
discreet about his private life than David Souter, but
when his relationship ended with Cagwin, who is now
married and living in Maine, its demise left Souter
emotionally crushed.
Second, Souter's less burdensome workload as a
judge allowed him to become the unpaid president of
Concord Hospital's board of trustees. Before long,
Souter was scheduling his Superior Court vacations so
he could handle hospital affairs. For five years, the
board presidency was "virtually a second job" and
Souter later confessed that "at times the hospital's
regulatory problems seemed to consume all of my time
not otherwise spent on the bench or asleep."
Souter enjoyed the personal interactions his
judgeship offered, particularly those with citizens
serving as jurors. As a jurist, however, Souter was
hard-nosed. For instance, he rejected a plea bargain
that would have released on probation a young woman
who had stolen a .357 Magnum revolver and instead
sentenced her to nine months' imprisonment. He also
was decidedly more rule-oriented than was generally
the case under New Hampshire's informal courtroom
customs. Word spread quickly, one lawyer recalls, that
"you really had to know what you were talking about"
when you appeared before Souter.
Even in Superior Court, that lawyer explained,
Souter "was really an appellate judge sitting as a trial
judge" and Souter filed many extensive though never
publicly printed written decisions. The most
significant of these was a 1981 ruling in State v.
Barney Siel, in which Souter quashed several
subpoenas issued to reporters by a local court acting
at the behest of a criminal defendant. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court later unanimously affirmed
Souter's decision, commenting that "we adopt the
well-reasoned position that the trial judge developed
at length in his rulings."
But perhaps the best insights into David Souter's
early years as a judge come from a posthumous
appreciation he wrote concerning Laurence I. Duncan,
a former New Hampshire justice. Duncan was a
solitary, almost withdrawn man, with few close
friends beyond his immediate family. But to Souter,
Duncan's judicial record was that of "a consummate
master craftsman of the law." Although Duncan was
"the most private of men," Souter wrote in the July
1983 New Hampshire Bar Journal, "he would spend
a lifetime quietly serving cultural and philanthropic
organizations and the collegiate interests of his court."
Souter added that Duncan thought "the world had a
fair claim to the highest use of his power to bring
order to human thought, for the sake of liberty and the
common good. He satisfied the claim in full and saved
the rest of his living for .. . his family and a very few
others." Souter's conclusion was personally poignant:
"He was my kind ofjudge.... He was an intellectual
hero of mine, and he always will be." More than a
decade later, a close Souter friend quietly stressed that
"he's writing about himself."
Throughout Souter's years on the trial bench,
Warren Rudman remained among his closest friends.
Rudman won election to the United States Senate in
1980 after defeating a fellow Republican, John
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Sununu, in a hard-fought primary. After Sununu
supported Rudman in the general election, Rudman
returned the favor two years later in Sununu's
successful gubernatorial campaign. Rudman never
concealed his opinion that Souter was "the finest
constitutional lawyer I've ever known," and when New
Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Maurice P. Bois
retired in mid-1983, Rudman uinmediately told
Sununu that David Souter should be elevated to that
court.
Sununu interviewed Souter and two other
candidates before sending Souter's name to the
Executive Council, which unanimously approved the
nomination. Souter told reporters that the past five
years had been "a very happy time," and later he
would view his trial court tenure as the best
experience of his professional life. But the promotion
was exactly what he had long aspired to. A few days
before his 44th birthday, David Souter was sworn in
as the junior member of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court.
The court that Souter joined in September 1983
contained two relatively young Thomson appointees,
Charles G. Douglas and David Brock, and two older,
less conservative men, the former Democratic Gov.
John W. King and the political independent William
F. Batchelder, who both had been named to the bench
by Thomson's Democratic successor, Hugh Gallen.
While Brock was not especially conservative,
Douglas's far more pronounced ideology nonetheless
featured a libertarian streak that in some criminal
cases made the youthful senior justice paradoxically
appear to be the court's most liberal member.
The court was located in a modern but somewhat
isolated building across the Merrimack River from
downtown Concord. At the end of each week in which
cases had been heard, the justices would convene and
take "straw votes" on each one. Then, in keeping with
court tradition, the justices would draw lots from an
antique silver pitcher in which the cases' docket
numbers had been placed. If a justice drew a case in
which he anticipated dissenting, the number would be
returned to the pitcher and he would draw again, but
otherwise each justice was responsible for writing the
court's opinion in whichever cases he drew,
irrespective of their subject matter or his preferences.
The court's egalitarian case assignment method
obviated any battling over opinion-writing duties and
forced justices to be generalists rather than specialists.
Unanimity was the norm, and when written dissents
were filed, no angry words ever appeared. In part, the
justices' collegiality stemmed from the justices' regular
interactions with one another; each working day the
five would lunch together at the court.
The relative infrequency of dissent was also a
product of the court's docket. Zoning disputes,
commercial conflicts, utility rate increases and scores
of routine criminal appeals -- many involving family
and/or sexual violence -- constituted the regular
staples of the New Hampshire court.
Souter quickly settled into the appellate routine.
Reading the briefs in each case the week before oral
argument, he would scribble questions on the covers.
Prior to Souter's arrival, Chuck Douglas had been the
most vocal member of the bench, but Souter soon
equaled and then exceeded Douglas. Some lawyers,
especially those representing criminal defendants,
came to resent the persistent grilling they often
received from the junior justice. James Duggan, the
state appellate defender who appeared before the court
more regularly than any other attorney, emphasizes
that while Souter "would really hammer people," he
nonetheless "was a pleasure to argue in front of'
because his questions always focused on each case's
toughest issues.
Especially in Souter's first year, he was slow to
circulate drafts of opinions, in part because he, unlike
most judges, did all his own writing rather than
relying upon his two clerks. In one 1984 case, State v.
Meister, in which the justices unanimously applied a
1981 precedent, Souter (whose own ruling as a trial
judge had been reversed in the 1981 case by a 3-2
vote) filed a concurrence explaining that although he
still agreed with the 1981 dissenters, "the
consequences of what I believe was an unsound
conclusion in that case are not serious enough to
outweigh the value of stare decisis."
Souter's strong preference for judicial restraint,
even in instances where his four colleagues felt
differently, emerged most dramatically in two cases
that raised the court's most hard-fought issue. The
first, State v. Forrest Ball, had been argued before
Souter's arrival. Following a new trend being
championed by several other state supreme courts,
Chuck Douglas used Ball -- an appeal of a drug
possession conviction where the defendant alleged that
the police had not had "probable cause" to stop him --
to rule that the New Hampshire court "has the power
to interpret the New Hampshire Constitution as more
protective of individual rights than the parallel
provisions of the United States Constitution." The
court would examine such independent state grounds
as its first priority in every case where the issue
appeared.
Souter believed that Ball's call for an expansive
application of the New Hampshire Constitution could
not be pursued without doing significant damage to
the state constitution's text and traditions. In 1985, the
Ball issue arose again in a case that highlighted Souter
a'nd his colleagues' differing perspectives on law
enforcement. Donald Koppel and Norman Forest were
2 of 18 drivers whom the Concord Police Department
had arrested for drunken driving during a six-month
series of roadblocks that had stopped some 1,700
motorists. Both men appealed their convictions,
arguing that the wholesale roadblocks -- in which all
drivers, not just erratic ones, were pulled over and
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questioned - violated the prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures contained in both
the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. All four
of Souter's colleagues found that contention
persuasive and concluded, in an opinion authored by
David Brock, that "the State has failed to show that
drunk-driving roadblocks produce sufficient public
benefit to outweigh their intrusion on individual
rights." Following Ball, they insulated their ruling
from any United States Supreme Court review by
declaring that "our holding rests solely on our
interpretation of the New Hampshire Constitution."
Souter's dissent reflected considerable
exasperation. Noting that the roadblocks delayed the
average driver only some two minutes, Souter
concluded that "the value of the roadblocks . . .
significantly outweigh[s] the minimal disadvantage to
the delayed drivers." There was no gainsaying that
Souter had lost the analytical war over Ball, but a few
years later his defense of D.W.I. roadblocks was
vindicated by the United States Supreme Court in a
case from Michigan.
Souter's colleagues and attentive lawyers
appreciated his intellectual precision, but Chuck
Douglas was not alone in viewing Souter as less
inclined to favor individual rights claims than his
colleagues. The state's appellate defender, James
Duggan, and his then-deputy, Joanne Green, lost far
more appeals than they won, and Green rues how
Souter's opinions impressed her even when the
outcomes were unwelcome: "I hated the fact that I
agreed with his logic."
Nowadays, Chuck Douglas characterizes the
David Souter of the mid-1980's as a "status quo, stare
decisis conservative." At the time, Souter would not
have quarreled with the characterization; a photo he
gave one clerk was inscribed to "the conscience of a
conservative these past two years, with gratitude from
David, still the conservative." Some attorneys
perceived more than a little competition between
Douglas and Souter during oral arguments, and one
court insider emphasizes that there was "no love lost
between the two of them." Suddenly, however, in
mid-1985, what promised to be a growing tussle for
intellectual leadership of the court ended unexpectedly
when Douglas returned to private practice, saying that
the justices' $54,896 annual salary was too low.
Douglas's departure left Souter as the court's most
powerful intellect. "He is by his nature a force at the
table," one colleague explains. "When he came to the
table, he had done his homework and knew his
position." Souter's fellow justices, realizing Souter's
"wonderful sense of humor," sometimes would tease
him about the almost superstitious regularity of his
behavior. Souter's habit of eating yogurt or cottage
cheese and an entire apple, core and all, for lunch
provided one splendid opportunity when someone
brought in an article highlighting how apple seeds
were potentially poisonous. As two still-sitting
members of the court tell the story, from that day
forward David Souter swallowed no more apple seeds.
Even a decade later, Souter is known to challenge
the apple seed story in precise but good-natured detail:
the article wasn't a news clipping brought in by
another justice; it was a Dartmouth Medical School
item Souter himself saw. The trace poison on the
seeds was cyanide, not arsenic. Most important, since
the article said seeds were harmful only in large
quantities, he did not change his apple-eating habits,
which continue to this day.
Souter's politely formal playfulness could
manifest itself in thank-you notes handwritten in Latin
or a bar of soap left on a clerk's desk the day after she
had uttered a four-letter word.
In mid-1986, Chief Justice King retired, opening
the door for what threatened to be the emotional
climax of Souter's professional life. Brock, as the
senior associate justice, was widely expected to be
Governor Sununu's choice, given the controversy that
had marked King's 1981 promotion over a more
senior colleague in violation of unwritten tradition.
Senator Rudman, however, mounted what one
participant called "quite an effort" on Souter's behalf,
and inside the court no one doubted that Souter was
very interested in the center chair. One equally
desirous colleague says the Chief Justiceship was
Souter's "life ambition" and that Souter wanted it "in
the worst way." A second justice agrees that "David
wanted to be Chief Justice," but adds that "everyone
wanted to become Chief Justice."
Sununu held 45-minute interviews with both
Brock and Souter and then, in advance of the
announcement, called Souter to say he was choosing
Brock. Publicly, Souter suffered no embarrassment,
for he had not been named as a possible choice, and
news reports simply noted how "Brock Nomination
Signals Return to Tradition of Seniority." Privately,
however, Souter was deeply disappointed, and
perhaps acutely wounded. One close observer called
it "something of a slap," since Souter already was
"intellectually the leader," and another court insider
thought Souter "deeply resented" Brock's selection.
But Souter was inclined to think that things always
happen for the best, and in the wake of his greatest
professional disappointment, he began to ponder
whether there might be life after the New Hampshire
Supreme Court.
Few cases on the court's docket offered
scintillating fare, but in one energetic 1987 dissent
from his colleagues' unwillingness to follow a 1973
precedent, Souter emphasized that "only the weightiest
of reasons could justify a refusal to honor the
expectations" of those who "should be entitled to rely
on the 1973 decision of this court."
Such opinions aside, however, for Souter the late
1980's was a time of increased introspection. One
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colleague thought he was "very unhappy" on the New
Hampshire court, and not so much with mundane
cases as with being "doomed to be an associate under
David Brock." By 1989, close friends were certain
that Souter was "ready for a new challenge." Privately,
Souter admitted to friends that he was toying with
ideas for a second career or extensive world travels,
but Warren Rudman focused on a possibility much
closer to home: New Hampshire's one judge on the
Federal First Circuit Court of Appeals, Hugh Bownes,
was old enough to move to semiretired "senior status."
When he did, Rudman, as New Hampshire's most
influential Republican senator, would effectively
control the Bush Administration's selection of his
successor. Some intimates believe Souter initially was
ambivalent about the Federal judgeship, but by the
time that Bownes did "go senior" in the winter of
1989-90, any hesitation had disappeared. The First
Circuit would offer a greater variety of cases than New
Hampshire, and Boston -- the First Circuit's home
city -- featured cultural attractions and was a
manageable drive from Weare. A brief, almost pro
forma hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee
was soon followed by unanimous Senate confirmation,
and on May 25, 1990, David Souter was sworn into
office by First Circuit Chief Judge Stephen Breyer.
Souter spent the early summer setting up his new
office in Concord's Federal building and in June he
traveled to Boston for his first sitting as a circuit
judge. Then, early one Sunday afternoon in late July,
a telephone call interrupted him at his Concord office:
C. Boyden Gray, George Bush's White House counsel,
explained that the President wanted to see Souter on
Monday and Souter should fly to Washington that
evemng.
Souter had heard Friday's news of the retirement
of Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan and he
knew that three years earlier Rudman had placed his
name on the Reagan White House's list of Court
prospects prior to the nomination of Justice Anthony
Kennedy. Gray's call, however, was totally
unexpected, as was the prospect of a face-to-face
Presidential interview the next day. Souter's first
reaction was to phone Rudman: "What have you done
to me now?" he asked his longtime patron. Rudman
gave him a pep talk and explained how Gray had
called on Saturday to request a recommendation letter;
Souter was on a Presidential short list of just four
names. Then, a few minutes later, Souter called
Rudman back: was it possible to fly directly from
Manchester to Washington? Yes, Rudman said.
Finally, after some reflection, Souter called for a third
time: the White House ought to know that he would
not discuss how he might rule in future cases. Rudman
assured him no such questions would be posed and
told Souter he'd take him to the airport for his 6 P.M.
flight.
An aide to Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
met Souter's plane and took him to another staff
member's home to have dinner and spend the night.
The next morning, Thornburgh's aide took Souter to
the White House, where Boyden Gray asked him
personal background questions aimed at exposing any
skeletons. Unbeknown to Souter, Federal appellate
Judge Edith H. Jones of Texas was also in the White
House, undergoing similar scrutiny; over the weekend
George Bush had narrowed his short list to two by
deleting Federal appellate Judges Clarence Thomas
and Laurence Silberman, both of Washington.
At 1:30 P.M., Souter was ushered into the Oval
Office for a 45-minute meeting with Bush,
Thornburgh, Gray and the White House chief of staff,
John Sununu, who as New Hampshire Governor had
named him to the state Supreme Court but had also
preferred David Brock for Chief Justice. Bush and his
aides had already interviewed Jones, and at the
conclusion of the Souter meeting, those four, joined by
Vice President Dan Quayle, spent an hour debating
the pros and cons of each finalist, with Bush asking
Quayle and Sununu to make the case for Jones and
Thornburgh and Gray for Souter. Jones had a more
conservative reputation than Souter, but Bush's aides
feared that her ideological renown would hamper
confirmation and the President had been highly
impressed by Souter's intellectual seriousness. Bush
spent almost an hour pondering the choice privately
before deciding, and at 4:15 P.M. Souter was
summoned back to the Oval Office to be offered the
nomination. At 5 P.M., with a visibly stunned David
Souter at his side, George Bush announced the
selection in the White House press room.
Souter's transformation from obscurity to national
celebrity was the greatest emotional shock he had ever
experienced. That evening, Warren Rudman took his
dazed friend to dinner before Souter turned in on a cot
in Rudman's Southwest Washington apartment.
Having anticipated only a one-day visit to
Washington, Souter had just the suit he'd worn on
Monday, plus a second tie, to carry him through the
following three days of senatorial courtesy calls. Only
on Friday did a shellshocked David Souter return
home.
After a visit to his mother, who now lived in a
Concord retirement community, Souter spent one
night in Weare before heading to Tom Rath's
lake-front summer home to escape the journalists
descending upon Concord. Reporters failed to distill
any clear ideological messages from Souter's New
Hampshire Supreme Court opinions, but some seemed
unable to grasp even the vast political difference
between being a protege of Warren Rudman rather
than of Meldrim Thomson or John Sununu. Rudman
proclaimed that "history will prove this to be one of
the greatest nominations of all time," but he admitted
that Souter led "an almost monastic life." Rudman
emphasized that if Souter "has any fault . . it's that
he's worked too hard all his life." Some journalists
were more interested in Souter's personal life than in
his professional record, and Souter's closest friends
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soon became intensely angry at several reporters'
preoccupation with Souter's "bachelor" status.
Souter found the intrusive media scrutiny
traumatic. "This is the biggest mistake I've made in
my life," he told one friend, and to another he
confessed that "this has been the worst week of my
life." By early August, with Senate Judiciary
Committee confirmation hearings scheduled for
mid-September, more and more speculation focused
upon Souter's position on Roe v. Wade. New
Hampshire's other United States Senator, Gordon
Humphrey, an extreme conservative who barely knew
Souter, anticipated that he would vote to overtum
Roe. But the more astute James Duggan observed that
even if Souter disagreed with Roe, "Whether he would
be willing to overturn the decision . .. is a different
proposition entirely." Liberal publications trumpeted
the news that the conservative Free Congress
Foundation had distributed a memo quoting John
Sununu as telling one of its leaders that Souter's
nomination was "a home run" for conservatives.
Privately, as Sununu recently told this author, his
belief that Souter would not uphold Roe was based
upon "very detailed" confidential assurances from W.
Stephen Thayer 3d, Souter's conservative junior
colleague on the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
When the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing
began on Thursday, Sept. 13, Senators and reporters
quickly realized that Souter was an impressively
erudite nominee. Souter spent three full days in front
of the 14-member committee, and amid all the
concepts and issues he was asked to address, two, in
retrospect, stand out as most revealing: liberty and
precedent. Most specifically, Souter stressed that in
the due process clause language of the 5th and 14th
Amendments, "the concept of liberty is not limited by
the specific subjects" listed in the Bill of Rights. In
protecting personal liberty, Justices had to search for
"principles that may be elucidated by the history and
tradition of the United States. And ultimately the kind
of search that we are making is a search for the limits
of governmental power-"
More generally, Souter explained that in reading
the Constitution, "my interpretive position is not one
that original intent is controlling, but that original
meaning is controlling," in that Justices ought to
identify the "principle that was intended to be
established as opposed simply to the specific
application that that particular provision was meant to
have by, and that was in the minds of those who
proposed and framed and adopted that provision in the
first place." He summed up his perspective in one
memorable sentence: "Principles don't change but our
perceptions of the world around us and the need for
those principles do."
Souter's comments about precedent were
potentially inseparable from the looming issue of Roe.
He highlighted the concept of reliance: "Who has
relied upon that precedent and what does that reliance
count for today?" If a court reconsidered a precedent,
it was important for judges to ask "whether private
citizens in their lives have relied upon it in their own
planning to such a degree that, in fact, there would be
a great hardship to overruling it now."
In his second day of testimony, Souter addressed
Roe directly. "I have not got any agenda on what
should be done with Roe v. Wade if that case were
brought before me. I will listen to both sides of that
case. I have not made up my mind." He added,
however, that when an existing case was attacked, any
reconsideration involved not only the correctness of
the earlier decision but also "extremely significant
issues of precedent." But regarding abortion itself, he
emphasized that "whether I do or do not find it moral
or immoral will play absolutely no role in any decision
which I make, if I am asked to make it, on the
question of what weight should or legitimately may be
given to the interest which is represented by the
abortion decision."
Legal observers reacted favorably to Souter's
testimony, with Walter Dellinger, then a Duke
University law professor, commenting that Souter was
"the most intellectually impressive nominee I've ever
seen." Most Senators agreed, and in late September
the Judiciary Committee ratified Souter's nomination
by a vote of 13-1. On Oct. 2, the full Senate followed
suit by a margin of 90 to 9, and on Oct. 8, 1990,
David Hackett Souter was sworn in as an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Unfortunately for Souter, the Court was already
one week into its 1990-91 term, and from the first day
he arrived, Souter found himself playing an
unwinnable game of catch-up. There was a huge
volume of petitions to review and briefs to read, and
Souter's relative unfamiliarity with Federal statutory
issues made the process all the more difficult. He soon
realized he was facing the most difficult professional
challenge of his life.
Throughout the fall, Souter continued to room
with Rudman before taking his own apartment at the
same complex, but he spent almost all of his waking
hours, on weekends as well as weekdays, at the Court.
Asked about his Washington social plans by a New
Hampshire magazine, Souter acknowledged that "I'm
not a very sociable individual except among a fairly
close circle of friends," most of whom lived in New
Hampshire. And, he added, "I'm not going to change
my personality as a result of getting a new job."
Souter's friends appreciated that the transition to
Washington was more difficult than he had
anticipated. Given Souter's "reverence" for the Court,
Tom Rath explained, Souter was not only "in awe of
the challenge" but also felt that "his first test was to
satisfy himself that he was worthy" of the job. Those
who saw him thought he looked more exhausted than
ever before; those who phoned him could sense he was
worried about keeping up with the caseload. Rath
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identified the stress succinctly: "David Souter's
harshest critic is David Souter."
By the spring of 1991, journalists were
wondering if Souter was foundering; prior to late May,
only one case in which he had written an opinion had
been decided, and as of mid-June, he had issued only
five more opinions. Finally, in the last week of the
term, another half-dozen Souter opinions appeared.
At the end of the term, a spent David Souter
headed home to New Hampshire, grateful for a
three-month respite from Washington. When he
returned in September to begin the new term, he was
fully prepared. The difference quickly showed in the
pace and scale of Souter's output, and by the time
Casey was argued in late April 1992, Souter had
found his equilibrium. Even though he missed New
Hampshire, he loved the Court and was a well-liked
figure within the Court building.
Casey was the most important case of the
1991-92 term, but there were other impressive Souter
successes. He, Kennedy and O'Connor also came
together, again joined by Blackmun and Stevens, in a
crucial establishment clause case, Lee v. Weisman,
where they struck down the recital of religious prayers
at public-school graduation ceremonies. Souter also
stepped to the fore in humorously taking on the
rhetorical excesses and interpretive shortcomings of
Antonin Scalia, the intellectual leader of the Court's
right wing. Indeed, of the term's 108 cases, Souter
dissented in only 8. But Casey was the highlight of
many a year, and both before the decision came down,
as well as after, David Souter did not for a moment
doubt the correctness or the importance of the trio's
achievement.
In the immediate aftermath of Casey, no one who
knew David Souter well, irrespective of their position
on abortion, was surprised by what Souter and his two
allies had said and done. From Chuck Douglas ("I was
not surprised by the Casey decision") to James
Duggan ("It should not be a surprise to anyone that
David Souter is not voting to overturn precedent") to
all of Souter's close friends, the reactions were
virtually identical.
What Casey boiled down to, Tom Rath said, was
"how the judiciary can bind a society together." David
Souter, he told one questioner, "has a vision of the
Court as a moderating influence," as "a conciliator and
legitimizer," and that perspective represented "the
essence of David Souter. That's the David Souter I've
heard many a night on porches."
Another close friend, echoing how Casey "wasn't
a surprise," especially given "David's respect for
precedent," stressed that people did not appreciate
how "David's a judicial conservative, not a political
conservative." Jane Cetlin Pickrell -- the former clerk
who had received the thank-you note in Latin, and the
bar of soap - felt similarly. He "may have had doubts
about Roe," because "we debated that at some point,"
but "I knew what he would do with Roe v. Wade,"
and Casey had proved her correct.
David Souter was happy to have the
constitutional battle over abortion behind him. The
1991-92 term had been vastly different from 1990-91,
and in Casey the Court had triumphantly passed a
crucial test. Given the workload, there was no way
around having his clerks do some opinion drafting,
but the amount of ink he added to almost every line of
their drafts left the clerks with no doubts whose
opinions they really were.
Neither the 1992-93 or 1993-94 terms would
prove as significant as 1991-92. The most striking
statistic of 1991-92, as Casey exemplified, was the
degree to which Anthony Kennedy had shifted away
from Rehnquist and toward Souter and O'Connor. But
in the following year, as Kennedy reverted to greater
agreement with the Chief Justice, Souter found himself
on the minority side of far more split decisions.
In New Hampshire, some defense attorneys were
pleasantly stunned by Souter's majority opinion in a
Miranda-related criminal case, Withrow v. Williams.
But Souter's most important opinion of 1992-93 was
a concurrence in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, a free-exercise clause
challenge to a municipal prohibition of animal
sacrifices that was targeted against Santeria
religionists. Souter's long concurrence in Lee v.
Weisman a year earlier had signaled his special
interest in the First Amendment's separation of church
and state, but Souter's Lukumi Babalu concurrence
was striking in how it explicitly called for the Court to
reconsider its reigning free-exercise clause precedent,
a 1990 decision entitled Employment Division v.
Smith.
At his confirmation hearing, Souter had said only
that "my own religion is a religion which I wish to
exercise in private and with as little . . expression in
the political arena as is possible," but he now made it
clear that Smith insufficiently protected religion from
government intrusion. Since earlier cases contained "a
free-exercise rule fundamentally at odds with the rule
Smith declared," there now existed "an intolerable
tension in free-exercise law." Quoting Felix
Frankfurter's reminder that stare decisis "is a principle
of policy and not a mechanical formula," Souter's
message was obvious -- Casey's affirmation of Roe
notwithstanding -- that Smith was a disposable
precedent.
The 1992-93 decline of the Souter-O'Connor-
Kennedy trio led some observers to highlight how
Kennedy had moved back rightward, but Paul Barrett
of The Wall Street Journal contended that actually the
"most striking development" was Souter's "emerging
liberal streak."
Once the 1993-94 term got under way, evidence
seemed to mount that Barrett's characterization was no
overstatement. James Duggan believed a Souter
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concurrence concerning the use of uncounseled
convictions for cumulative sentencing in Nichols v.
U.S. was almost "180 degrees different" from a 1984
Souter opinion, State v. Cook. A few weeks later, one
New Hampshire Supreme Court insider, reacting
joyously to a Souter concurrence on behalf of fellow
Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
in a Miranda-oriented military murder case, Davis v.
U.S., vehemently exclaimed that "that was not the
David Souter that sat on this bench!"
But the most dramatic 1993-94 evidence of
Souter's increasingly influential intellectual leadership
of the Court's six mainstream members was the
growing number of combative references that Antonin
Scalia was directing to him in multiple opinions.
Supreme Court insiders emphasize that in person, the
two justices "like each other" and "kid around," but
based upon the written record, there is little doubt that
Scalia now realizes - much as Felix Frankfurter did
after the advent of Earl Warren and William Brennan
-- that he has decisively lost the struggle for
intellectual leadership of the Court to someone who
was not supposed to be a major player.
In one late June habeas corpus ruling, Heck v.
Humphrey, three contentious Scalia footnotes
criticized Souter by name; three days later, in one of
the term's leading cases, Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, Scalia in
angry dissent dismissed Souter's majority opinion as
"facile" and petulantly invoked Souter's name again
and again in criticizing the outcome. Seemingly both
provoked and bemused, Souter responded that "Justice
Scalia's dissent is certainly the work of a gladiator, but
he thrusts at lions of his own imagining."
The 1993-94 term witnessed Souter's highest
output of his four years on the Court - 25 opinions (8
majority, 12 concurrences and 5 dissents), more than
double the number he wrote his first year. In part,
Souter's increased productivity reflected what he told
friends was a lesson he had learned in each of his three
judgeships: only after three years does one get fully up
to speed.
But even though Souter was now completely at
ease, the results of the 1993-94 term showed that he
and his three most regular allies - Blackmun, Stevens
and Ginsburg, who had been together in 11 of the
year's 14 5-4 cases - had been the losing foursome in
8 of those 11, prevailing only in 3 criminal cases
where they were joined by Kennedy. And if one looked
at the 35 cases where Blackmun and Rehnquist had
come out on opposite sides, perhaps Souter's
"emerging liberal streak" was no exaggeration at all:
While Ginsburg had sided 19 times with Blackmun
and 16 with Rehnquist (and O'Connor only 7 with
Blackmun and 27 with Rehnquist), Souter had been
with Blackmun in 24 of the cases and with Rehnquist
in only 11.
Right-wing Court watchers rued Souter's
evolution. Thomas Jipping of the Free Congress
Foundation, reminding the conservative Washington
Times that "John Sununu told me directly that Souter
would be a 'home run' for conservatives," offered a
sarcastically dismissive metaphor: "The first term, I
thought he might be a blooper single. After last year,
I thought he was a foul ball. Now I think he's a
strikeout."
But Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times
saw it differently: "Souter's brand of moderate
pragmatism and his willingness to engage Justice
Scalia in direct intellectual combat is probably as
responsible as any single factor for the failure of the
conservative revolution."
A chagrined John Sununu readily concedes that he
is "very surprised" -- and deeply disappointed -- by
David Souter's evolution. In sharp contrast, however,
former President Bush tells this author that he is
proud of Souter's "outstanding" service and
"outstanding intellect." Some antagonists, Bush
recalls, greeted the nomination by dismissing Souter
as "a predictable, extreme right-winger." Now Bush
quietly exults over "how wrong his critics were. This
quiet decent man will serve for years on the Court, and
he will serve with honor always and with brilliance."
The arrival of new Justice Stephen Breyer will
make for few changes in the Court's basic lineup. In
controversial cases, Breyer likely will take his
predecessor Harry Blackmun's place in the
Souter-Stevens-Ginsburg quartet. Although Breyer
will be more centrally involved in the Court's
discussions than was Blackmun, the highly pragmatic
Breyer likely will make few waves on what Harvard's
Laurence Tribe calls a "fundamentally
unadventuresome and cautious Court." The widely
anticipated retirement of John Paul Stevens after the
Court's 1994-95 term is expected to result in his
replacement with a similarly mainstream voice, and
only an unanticipated departure from the more
conservative ranks of O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas is likely to generate any significant
ideological shift in the Court's alignment. If none of
those justices leave prior to the 1996 Presidential
election, the eventual timing of William Rehnquist's
departure as Chief Justice - generally expected to
occur after, rather than before, the 1996 balloting --
looms as the next turning point in the Court's history.
Whoever replaces Rehnquist as Chief Justice -- and
whoever as President gets to make that choice -- will
be responsible for piloting the Court into the next
century.
One of Souter's former New Hampshire judicial
colleagues argues that Souter in his four Washington
years has undergone "a remarkable jurisprudential
transformation" into a "kinder, gentler" judge.
Virtually all of Souter's personal friends reject that
characterization as overstated; Tom Rath firmly
contends that "I don't think David has changed as a
judge."
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But if Souter is indeed evolving as a jurist,
personally little has changed from his days in
Concord. "He was the same person as Attorney
General as he is now," says one former assistant and
longtime friend. Warren Rudman attests that Souter's
"wonderful dry sense of humor" remains unchanged,
and someone who has come to know him well since
1990 stresses that "he's a very funny fellow." Tom
Rath insists that "David Souter hasn't changed a bit"
and recalls how this past New Year's, Souter joined
the Raths and another couple for a five-hour dinner of
lasagna and wine. "It was exactly the same" as years
past, Rath says almost in amazement. "He's still
David" and "his real life is here."
But spending nine months a year in Washington
rather than Weare has of course changed Souter some.
One recent acquaintance expresses mild surprise at
"how well informed he is about the way the world is,"
and an old friend explains that "he's become much
more contemporary" in his cultural awareness. Asking
if a listener knows the New Hampshire Supreme
Court story about a befuddled Souter saying that the
only Garfield he'd heard of was a President, not a cat,
the friend explains that Souter now is able -- with
prompting - to name all of the Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtles.
Another difference in Souter's Washington life is
the importance that running has assumed in the
relatively few waking hours when he's not at the
Court. Souter aims to run at least four nights a week
at Fort McNair's outdoor track, only a block or so
from his apartment, but even while jogging within
McNair's guarded walls, one can sometimes hear the
sounds of real-world gunshots not far away.
One change that Souter dislikes intensely is being
recognized in public. Becoming a Justice has meant
"losing his ability to be a private person," one friend
says, and another recounts with distress how a few
days after Casey, as they walked across Boston
Common, "you could feel people turning to look."
Especially in Boston, Souter enjoys going out in
public - taking his goddaughter, Jane Cetiin Pickrelil's
6-year-old, for swan boat rides in the Public Garden or
afternoon tea at the Ritz-Carlton - and while he
resents losing his anonimity, his innate politeness
compels him to grin and bear it.
If David Souter has a real secret, it's the diary -
the daily journal he has kept since age 13. In 1990,
both The Los Angeles Times and The Concord
Monitor mentioned it in passing, and former
colleagues on the New Hampshire court nervously
joke about what it may have on them. Friends say
Souter's diary writing -- which is largely devoted to
recounting stories told by others, rather than the day's
events - has increased sharply in Washington, in part
because of the inspiration provided by such
memorable storytellers as the late Thurgood Marshall.
Intensely worried that widespread awareness of the
diary could result in a burglary, Souter keeps none of
it in Weare or in his Washington apartment.
Souter reveres the Court, and while he sees few
newspapers, when clerks or friends show him
published critiques of his colleagues -- whether
right-wing columnists trashing Anthony Kennedy or
neo-liberals disparaging the careers of Byron White
and Harry Blackmun -- Souter can react angrily. And
Souter's respect for the Court's institutional privacy
extends to deep dismay at any personal publicity. "He
doesn't like his friends speculating about his judicial
opinions," stresses one intimate, catching himself
doing just that.
"David is a much better politician than people
give him credit for," one of his closest friends
volunteers in explaining Souter's influence and
success on the Court. Reluctantly, several
acquaintances confess that Souter privately has talked
about the possibility of stepping down at age 65 -- 10
years hence -- but none of them take the comment
seriously. Personally happy and professionally
fulfilled, David Souter likely will help lead the Court
well into the second decade of the 21st century. Says
one friend, "A man more comfortable with himself
would be hard to find."
David J. Garrow, the author of "Liberty and
Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of
Roe v. Wade," won a 1987 Pulitzer Prize for
"Bearing the Cross."
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ROOKIE ON SUPREME COURT BECOMES KEY PLAYER
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Monday, May 1, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
A justice's first year on the Supreme Court is
often an ordeal. But Stephen Breyer seems to be
settling in just fine.
The rookie justice has made himself a central
player by writing opinions ranging from last week's
dissent from the Court's decision to strike down the
federal law banning possesion of guns near a school
to an earlier majority opinion on protecting the rights
of state prison inmates. Justice Breyer declined to be
interviewed.
"He is asserting himself to a surprising degree for
a first-year justice," observes Michael Seidman, a law
professor at Georgetown University.
And there are signs that justices at the court's
center and on the left - Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David
Souter and John Paul Stevens -- find Justice Breyer's
moderate, pragmatic approach attractive. He could
play a vital role over the next two months if he can
persuade more conservative Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor or Anthony Kennedy to tip a bit to the left
and provide the decisive vote in politically charged
cases on race, religion and free speech.
The only member of the court who occasionally
bicycles to work, Justice Breyer, 56, has confidently
done legal battle with Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, both aggressive
conservatives. A budding rivalry with Justice Scalia,
in particular, resembles nothing so much as a zesty
debate between cocksure law professors, which they
both once were.
"My impression is that [Justice Breyer] is
deliriously happy down there in that unposmg
building," says Richard Zeckhauser, a longtime friend
and fellow Harvard professor.
Others might concentrate all their energy on a new
job. Justice Breyer is shuttling back and forth to
Cambridge, Mass., not only to see his wife, Joanna,
but also to teach a Harvard seminar on industry
regulation with Mr. Zeckhauser. "I fax stuff to the
court, and he reads it on the plane," Mr. Zeckhauser
explains.
Justices Souter and Clarence Thomas have said
privately that during their respective first terms, they
were overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of
the high court's workload. Justice Breyer, in contrast,
seems supremely comfortable - for example, he
whispers amiably with his benchmate, Justice
Thomas, during lawyers' oral arguments. The chief
justice, a stickler for deadlines, has happily remarked
in private on Justice Breyer's promptness in drafting
opinions.
Some have been notable for their sweep and
ambition. in the 5-4 gun-control decision issued last
Wednesday, the majority abruptly revised 60 years of
jurisprudence on how far Congress may go in
exercising its constitutional power to regulate
interstate commerce. The high court struck down a
federal law enacted under the Constitution's commerce
clause -- a ban on guns within 1,000 feet of a school
-- on the grounds that the problem was too local and
noncommercial to justify congressional oversight.
Leading the conservative majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist announced a rigid- sounding rule: Congress
may regulate activities only if they "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. Justice Breyer, in the
main dissenting opinion, countered that such cases
shouldn't turn on adverbs like "substantially." Instead,
he proposed a broad sociological analysis (complete
with a 17-page bibliographical appendix) of how guns
and violence disrupt education in many areas, which,
in turn, damages the nation's economy. Joining the
dissent were Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens.
"He comes across from a very pragmatic
perspective and wants to sweep away" strict rules,
notes Barry Friedman, a law professor at Vanderbilt
University who filed a brief in the case on the
majority's side.
Justice Breyer's most intriguing encounter with
Justice Scalia came in a decision earlier this month,
again on the scope of congressional authority. They
agreM nn the hnttnm line - that Congress violated the
constitutional separation of powers when it enacted a
law reopening a small batch of dismissed
securities-fraud lawsuits - but they got to the
conclusion in starkly different ways.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared
that Congress may never revive dead suits. Justice
Breyer wrote that the court should approach such
separation-of-powers cases by asking whether
Congress has interfered with judicial proceedings in a
way that singles out one person or a small group for
unfavorable treatment. In this case, only a relatively
few defendants would suffer under the suit - reviving
law, so Justice Breyer agreed to kill it.
Riled by what he called Justice Breyer's "Delphic
alternative" to his own more categorical reasoning,
Justice Scalia wrote: "Separation of powers, a
distinctively American political doctrine, profits from
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the advice authored by a distinctively American poet:
'Good fences make good neighbors."'
Not to be outdone on his Robert Frost, Justice
Breyer fired back with another excerpt from the poem
"Mending Wall": "Before I built a wall I'd ask to
know/What I was walling in or walling out."
Justice Breyer's majority opinion in a case on the
typically contentious topic of state prisoners' rights
was notable for its even tone - and the fact that it
attracted the votes of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
Writing for a six-member majority in February,
Justice Breyer clarified a federal judge's responsibility
for guarding the rights of state prison inmates. The
high court's recent rulings in this area have bristled
with hostility and impatience over prolonged appeals
by state prisoners, especially those on death row.
Justice Breyer avoided the sort of passionate,
civil-libertarian tone on the issue associated with the
man he replaced, retired Justice Harry Blackmun.
Instead, he calmly explained that as a matter of
common sense and fairness, a federal judge who can't
decide conclusively whether a constitutional error
affected the result of a state-court trial must assume
that it did, and order a new trial.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who otherwise
might have gone the other way, joined this majority.
That left the court's conservative right wing - Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas -
in dissent.
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AT LONG LAST, SENIORITY
'Quirky' Stevens Takes Helm of Court's Liberal Wing
The Washington Post
Copyright 1995
Monday, March 20, 1995
Joan Biskupic
Washington Post Staff Writer
For six years after his 1975 appointment, Justice
John Paul Stevens was the lowly freshman on the
bench, charged with keeping minutes during the
justices' closed conferences and answering the door.
He was the last to cast his vote, and in court he was
relegated to the far right end of the bench.
Stevens was the junior justice longer than any
other justice this century, having to wait until 1981 for
the arrival of Sandra Day O'Connor. But this term, 20
years and seven new freshman justices later, Stevens,
74, has reached the senior-most position after Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, and he is at the helm of
the liberal wing. Harry A. Blackmun, who had been
the most senior of the liberals, retired last term.
Now, Stevens is first after Rehnquist to speak in
conferences and has greater opportunity to persuade
his colleagues. After an initial round of votes on a
case, if Rehnquist is in the majority, he, as chief,
decides who will write the opinion. But when
Rehnquist is in the minority, the senior associate with
the majority (now, most likely to be Stevens)
designates who writes for the court.
This silver-haired, bow-tied justice - who has a
reputation for unconventionality - could have
increasing influence on his colleagues. Among the key'
cases this term are affirmative action, voting rights
and the separation of church and state.
But just who is this justice so often characterized
as "quirky"? When the vote on the court is 8 to 1,
Stevens is likely to be the one.
"Everything he writes has an internal coherence,"
said Clifford Sloan, a former Stevens law clerk. "It
just doesn't correspond to the frames of reference
adopted by those on the left or those on the right."
Sloan, who most recently worked in the White
House counsel's office and is about to return to
appellate practice, said that Stevens "believes deeply
in the power of reason, and he will take his reasoned
analysis of a case wherever it goes."
Another former clerk, Stewart A. Baker, has
written that Stevens possesses a unique combination
of "judicial restraint" and "iconoclastic creativity."
The justice disdains hard and fast rules, but his own
brand of pragmatism "has a radical side," said Baker,
a former general counsel at the National Security
Agency who is now in private practice.
University of Virginia law professor Pamela
Karlan, who clerked for Blackmun, observed that
Stevens expresses his individual views in separate
statements more than most of the other justices, so his
personality is more evident. Stevens also drafts his
own opinions, down to the footnotes, rather than rely
on his law clerks for the task as other justices do.
The routine at the court is that one justice usually
writes for the majority and one for the dissenters.
Irrespective of which side Stevens is on, he tends to
tack a separate statement onto the record. Last term he
wrote more dissenting statements than any other
justice. He and Justice Antonin Scalia, who is at the
other end of the ideological spectrum, tied for the
highest number of opinions issued. Most of their
opinions did not reflect the majority's view.
But overall, the Chicago native, who was
President Gerald R. Ford's only high court
appointment, is a strong defender of prisoners' rights
and has increasingly criticized state death penalty
procedures and the court's resistance to review
condemned inmates' cases. He supports abortion
rights, a high wall of separation between church and
state and a broad reading of the Constitution's free
speech guarantee.
But always with Stevens, there are exceptions.
The former Navy officer and recipient of the Bronze
Star voted (in the minority) to uphold statutes
prohibiting flag burning. He said some forms of
expression may be banned if society has a legitimate
interest unrelated to speech content, such as protecting
the flag as a national symbol.
One area where Stevens, a graduate of
Northwestern University Law School and a former
appeals judge, also draws distinctions is on
affirmative action. In 1980, he was one of three
dissenters (including Rehnquist and the late Potter
Stewart) who refused to uphold a congressional
minority set-aside program intended to remedy past
discrimination.
'[I]f Congress is to authorize a recovery for a
class of similarly situated victims of a past wrong, it
has an obligation to distribute that recovery among the
members of the injured class in an even-handed way,"
Stevens wrote in a separate dissent. He added that his
overriding concern was if the history of discrimination
"can justify such a random distribution of benefits on
racial lines . . . it will serve not merely as a basis for
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remedial legislation, but rather as a permanent source
ofjustification for grants of special privileges."
But then in 1986, he refused to accept the
majority's view that an affirmative action plan under
which white teachers were laid off to preserve the jobs
of newly hired black teachers was unconstitutional.
Stevens said the school had a valid public purpose
and used fair procedures.
In 1990, Stevens ruled with the majority to strike
down a Richmond construction set-aside program.
Then a year later he voted (with a different majority)
to rule that Congress may order preferential treatment
of minorities to increase their ownership of broadcast
licenses. He explained in that 1990 case that he
endorses a "focus on the future benefit, rather than the
remedial justification" of affirmative action.
For the first time since 1990, the justices now are
considering the constitutionality of a federal set-aside
program. Stevens could be a critical vote in the
Denver case, which is expected to be decided by the
end of June.
Stevens, who turns 75 next month and is the
eldest on the court, is likely to be the next justice to
retire. But many people close to him say that he
relishes his new seniority and is unlikely to leave the
bench any time soon.
Still, the former champion bridge player, private
pilot and tennis enthusiast is unpredictable. His
influence has yet to be determined. Baker wrote in the
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution that
Stevens's "candor will always make him something of
an outsider; it shows a glint of cheerful mischief too
often for him to be a classic majority-building
centrist."
"A lot of it will depend on how many opinions he
gets to assign," said Karlan, who is reviewing
Stevens's opinions for an April conference at Rutgers
University commemorating the justice's 20-year
tenure. The more liberal side of the court, which he
leads, has been bolstered by the addition of President
Clinton's appointees, Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and President George Bush's
appointee, David H. Souter - who increasingly votes
with the left.
Justice Stevens "may keep the opinions to himself
or he might use [the assignment power] to bind other
junior justices to him. [Justice William J.] Brennan
was a master of assigning opinions to make others feel
a part of his team .. . to build bonds."
Stevens is self-effacing during oral arguments. He
often begs forgiveness for interrupting a lawyer and
begins by saying: "Excuse me, there's one thing that
puzzles me."
But Sloan, who argued several times before the
court when he was an assistant solicitor general, said
Stevens's deferential style frequently accompanies a
piercing line of inquiry. "As he begins to ask his
question, you can hear the saw going into the floor
around you."
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court
EDUCATION BA, University of Chicago, 1941; JD,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1947
CAREER HIGHLIGHTS, Law clerk to Supreme
Court Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, 1947-48; law
practice, Chicago, 1949-70; judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, 1970-75; nominated to
the Supreme Court by President Gerald R. Ford,
November 1975; confirmed December 1975
PERSONAL, Married; four children.
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JUSTICE THOMAS' OPINIONS CUT A DEEPLY CONSERVATIVE SWATH
Los Angeles Times
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David G. Savage
Times Staff Writer
The Supreme Court has switched directions on
matters of race, and nothing more vividly illustrates
the dramatic change than the words of its lone black
justice, Clarence Thomas, the man who replaced civil
rights legend Thurgood Marshall.
In an opinion issued last week, Thomas
complained that much of school desegregation law is
"based on a theory of black inferiority," one that
insists black children can learn only if they are mixed
with a proper proportion of white pupils.
Nor is there anything "affirmative" about
affirmative action, he added. It is a type of "racial
paternalism" that suggests minorities cannot compete
without whites' "patronizing indulgence," said
Thomas, who last week cast the fifth and deciding
vote in separate cases to cut back on school
desegregation and federal affirmative action programs.
"In my mind, government-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination based on malicious
prejudice," he wrote.
In this, his fourth term on the high court, Thomas
has emerged as its most provocative writer and most
assertive conservative. In one area of law after
another, he has written strong, separate opinions this
year that fundamentally challenge the conventional
view of the law.
While many of his opinions are not likely to
become law any time soon-even his fellow
conservatives have shied away from his more extreme
writings-academics on the right and left say Thomas
has changed the debate by reviving ideas that have
long been ignored.
"He has turned out to be a more active and more
powerful person than anyone thought possible in
1991," said University of Chicago law professor
Richard A. Epstein, himself a legendary iconoclast
who has championed the revival of individual property
rights.
"He is going back to first principles . . . and
writing about the most fundamental change in the
structure of government," Epstein said. "I agree with
him that most of what the federal government does is
mischievous and wrong."
Said Notre Dame University law professor
Douglas Kmiec, another admirer: "You can't say he is
just (Justice Antonin) Scalia's shadow-the 'me-too'
justice. He has emerged as a strong voice on his own."
For their part, liberal academics and civil rights
lawyers say Thomas has proven to be even worse than
they had feared.
"It's just startling. He must be a deeply embittered
man," said American University law professor
Herman Schwartz. "He sees anything that tries to help
blacks as a mark of inferiority. Remember, this is
someone who benefited from affirmative action at
every stage of his career."
Thomas, who turns 47 on Friday, grew up in
poverty in Georgia. He compiled a solid academic
record as an undergraduate at Holy Cross College in
Massachusetts, where he was graduated in 1971. Yale
University officials say he entered law school that year
through a new program that sought to recruit
promising black students.
In 1981, Thomas was one of the few black
conservative lawyers to join the Ronald Reagan
Administration, and the next year the 33-year-old
attorney was named chairman of the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. When his
appointment expired in 1990, he was appointed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals. The next year, when Marshall
retired, President George Bush selected Thomas for
the Supreme Court.
Theodore Shaw, associate legal director for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, said
Thomas often writes "in a vacuum" and "ignores the
facts of the case."
For example, in the school desegregation case,
Thomas accused a federal judge in Kansas City of
devising an expensive program of school
improvements with the hope of attracting suburban
whites. But Shaw said the new school buildings and
better-paid teachers were designed mostly to help
black children who attend the city schools.
"It was interesting discourse, but it was also
simplistic and missed the point," Shaw said of
Thomas' opinion. "I would think a Supreme Court
justice would have a better understanding of the
issue."
African American scholars say Thomas' views on
racial issues reflect a viewpoint sometimes heard in
black communities but one that is not likely to become
the majority view.
"He has a conservative black nationalist
position," said Harvard University law professor
Randall Kennedy. "That's not novel in itself. Those
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ideas have been around for a while. But it seems
strange and inconsistent coming from him."
Usually, Thomas argues that race should be
downplayed or ignored as a distinction. "But
occasionally, he speaks up as a black person and
seems to say: 'I have more authority to speak on these
subjects because I'm black,' " Kennedy said.
In a 1992 ruling calling for the further
desegregation of Mississippi's state colleges, Thomas
wrote a separate opinion to say that Southern blacks
want to retain historically black colleges as "a source
of hope (and) a source of pride."
He also raised questions about a ruling that
barred the use of race as a basis for screening out
potential jurors, saying it might have an adverse
impact on black defendants in the South who might
face all-white juries as a result.
In April, the court heard arguments in a key
religion case that concerned whether a religious
symbol such as cross can be erected on public land in
front of a state office building.
In a rare comment, Thomas took issue with the
premise that the cross in this case was a religious
symbol because it had been erected by a member of
the Ku Klux Klan. For black Americans, a "burning
cross" does not symbolize Christianity, Thomas said.
While Thomas now offers a black perspective on
some legal issues, his opinions are generally opposite
those of Marshall, a staunch liberal and the first black
member of the high court.
Marshall's greatest victory as a lawyer practicing
before the court came in 1954 when the court in the
Brown vs. Board of Education ruling declared official
segregation unconstitutional.
In his separate opinion in last week's
desegregation case, Missouri vs. Jenkins, Thomas said
he agreed that forced segregation was a "despicable
system" that should have been abolished. However, he
faulted the late Chief Justice Earl Warren for writing
an opinion that said segregation was wrong because it
gave black children a "feeling of inferiority." In a
footnote, Warren cited a study by social psychologist
Kenneth B. Clark that found black girls in segregated
schools often chose to play with white dolls.
The use of that study has been roundly criticized
by legal scholars, who noted other studies showed
black children in integrated schools also chose white
dolls. Did that mean integration was harmful?
"Psychological or social science research" has no
place in constitutional law, Thomas said, nor is it
needed "in order to announce the simple, yet
fundamental truth that the government cannot
discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race."
Thomas stopped just short of saying he would
dismantle the remaining court-ordered desegregation
plans and give up on the goal of truly integrated
public education.
In the affirmative action case, Thomas derided
white liberals for pressing the view that blacks need
special preferences to achieve equality.
"There can be no doubt that racial paternalism
and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous
and pernicious as any other form of discrimination,"
he wrote. "These programs stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or adopt an attitude that they are
'entitled' to preferences."
Issues of race are hardly Thomas' main concern.
Indeed, his longest and most thorough opinions this
year have come in cases concerning the Constitution's
allocation of power between Congress and the states.
Last month, he issued a separate opinion
suggesting the court took a "wrong turn" in 1937
when it upheld President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal and gave the Democratic Congress the power to
set minimum wages and regulate the economy.
To modern ears, his view sounds quaint, even
bizarre. The Constitution gives Congress the power to
"regulate commerce among the states." When that
phrase was written in 1787, it referred to the
"transport of goods," not to "business generally,"
Thomas concluded. He suggested that the court should
use this original understanding to "modify our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence."
That prospect cheers Epstein. It would mean, he
said, that federal laws on civil rights, the environment
and workplace safety, along with dozens of others,
would be wiped off the books because they would
exceed Congress' power to regulate commerce.
But that is hardly likely. In an apparent response
to Thomas, Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Sandra
Day O'Connor, two moderate conservatives, added a
short note saying they were not prepared to rewrite the
past 60 years of constitutional law.
Almost assuredly, Thomas will be heard from
more in the next two weeks. The court is expected to
issue major rulings on "racial gerrymandering,"
religion in schools and the reach of the Endangered
Species Act.
"He may be swimming up the stream," Kmiec
said, "but he seems determined to say what he thinks."
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In seven years on the Supreme Court, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy has been neither ideological
leader nor political strategist. His writings have drawn
little attention from law reviews, and it is part of court
lore that he's so little known a group of tourists once
asked him to take their picture.
While Kennedy may lack the bold personality or
compelling background of other justices, he has
earned one important distinction: On a closely divided
court, he holds the decisive vote.
Along with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
Kennedy will be the justice to watch as the court in the
weeks ahead decides major cases involving free
speech rights, the separation of church and state and
the constitutionality of government policies based on
race. More often than O'Connor, however, it is
Kennedy who casts the fifth - and deciding -- vote
and in recent years he has been in the majority on
important cases more than any other justice.
It was Kennedy, 58, who made the difference
recently when the court struck down state-imposed
term limits for members of Congress. This vote
incurred the wrath of conservative columnist George
F. Will and prompted him to lament once again that
Robert H. Bork was not confirmed for the court
because it was Kennedy to whom President Ronald
Reagan finally turned after the Bork nomination failed
and another nominee, Douglas H. Ginsburg,
withdrew.
Many of Kennedy's prominent "fifth votes" have
leu t uoiral iulings. Bt LK eniduy is overall a
conservative jurist, refusing to expand the role of the
courts in American life and believing social policy is
best left to elected officials.
Kennedy, however, tends to vote with liberals on
First Amendment issues and took the lead to ensure
that in all kinds of trials potential jurors would not be
rejected because of their race. Court opinions written
by him broadened a 1986 decision that prevents
prosecutors from using their peremptory strikes to
exclude jurors based on race.
In 1992, Kennedy surprisingly voted to uphold
Roe v. Wade, which had made abortion legal
nationwide. In doing so, he reversed his earlier stance
that the 1973 landmark case went beyond
constitutional guarantees. Also in 1992, Kennedy
voted against prayer at public high school
graduations, backing away from his previous
sentiment for more interaction between church and
state.
Both switches enraged conservatives, who
accused Kennedy of lacking conviction and of abiding
liberal interests. Some law professors called him
rudderless. And of Kennedy's opinion against
graduation prayer, in which Kennedy referred to social
pressure on schoolchildren, Justice Antonin Scalia
said: "Interior decorating is a -rock-hard science
compared to psychology practiced by amateurs."
Former law clerk Peter Keisler said Kennedy's
views are unaffected by public criticism: "Justice
Kennedy is a very sophisticated man who knows that
whatever a Supreme Court justice does, somebody
will criticize him or her for it. That doesn't influence
his decisions."
In fact, Kennedy has also angered liberals, if less
publicly. In 1989, he pledged his vote on an important
civil rights case to then-Justice William J. Brennan
Jr., only to switch it and rob Brennan of the majority.
The effects of the court's decision, narrowing the
breadth of an anti-discrimination law for workers,
were later overturned by Congress.
Because of these reversals, some law clerks and
other court observers have dubbed Kennedy, who is an
avid student of Shakespeare, "Hamlet," as well as
some less desirable nicknames, such as "Flipper," or
"Nini" ("Ninny") as in a weak version of conservative
firebrand Antonin "Nino" Scalia.
Rutgers University law professor Michael Dorf,
who was a law clerk for Kennedy the year he provided
the fifth vote to uphold abortion rights, said, "The
Hamlet reputation is mostly undeserved."
"Even if we assume that, more than other justices,
he will change his mind after a vote.. . . I think that is
because he wants to see if [a particular position]
'writes' itself," said Dorf, explaining that for Kennedy
the process of writing helps produce - or reveal the
flaws of - an argument.
"I think there are fewer easy cases for him than
anyone else on the court," Dorf added.
The term limits case and the decision to block
federal lawmakers from banning guns near local
schools -- another recent decision in which Kennedy
made the difference - both involved the balance of
state and federal powers, a great interest of Kennedy,
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who taught constitutional law for 23 years before he
joined the high court.
His writings in those two important cases echo a
speech he made in 1987 just weeks before Reagan
named him to fill the seat of retired justice Lewis F.
Powell Jr.
Kennedy stressed then and in his recent opinions
that while the states may not invade the sphere of
federal sovereignty, the federal government must stay
within its own boundaries of power.
In the term limits case three weeks ago, he wrote,
"Federalism was our nation's own discovery. The
Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the
genius of their idea that our citizens would have two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other."
Kennedy straddles the middle on the issue, with
the more conservative justices (who were in the
dissent in the term limits case) seeking to enhance
states' authority and better protect them from federal
interference. The more liberal members (who
dissented when the court struck down federal gun
control at schools) are more ready to read broad
congressional power into the Constitution.
"The people who get the most attention are going
to be on the extremes," said Dorf, "even though the
court for a long time has been led from the center."
Dorf said Kennedy takes seriously "the notion that
ajudge is supposed to be doing something other than
giving vent to his personal philosophy."
Tulsa businessman R. Dobie Langenkamp, who
went through Stanford University and Harvard Law
School with Kennedy, said, "The key is that Tony has
never been doctrinaire or ideological; rather, he is
pragmatic."
Kennedy is not known for his political instincts or
interests, despite his background in a politically active
Republican family in Sacramento, Calif. His mother,
Gladys "Sis" Kennedy, a teacher, was active in civic
affairs. Kennedy's father, Anthony J. "Bud" Kennedy,
was a lawyer and lobbyist, once described by his son
as a "country doctor-type." The family home drew an
assortment of GOP big shots and community leaders,
and before he was a teenager Kennedy worked as a
page in the California state Senate.
After he graduated from Harvard Law in 1961,
Kennedy worked for a San Francisco firm. But in
1963, when his father died, he returned to Sacramento
and took over his business. Kennedy handled garden
variety lawsuits, divorce cases and minor criminal
matters. He also continued representing at the
statehouse the major corporations his father had
cultivated.
Through his own work for then-Gov. Reagan (R)
and gubernatorial assistant Edwin Meese III, Kennedy
came to the attention of President Gerald R. Ford in
1975 for a vacancy on the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals. Kennedy was easily confirmed.
Some former classmates of Kennedy recalled
going back to their yearbooks to figure out who he
was when Reagan nominated him to the high court.
One old friend described Kennedy as being practically
"born mature."
As a justice, Kennedy promotes the image of
doing the right thing, of having the weight of the
world on his shoulders. On the morning that he would
announce his abortion vote in June 1992, he allowed
a reporter for California Lawyer magazine into his
chambers. "Sometimes you don't know if you're
Caesar about to cross the Rubicon," he told the
reporter, "or Captain Queeg cutting your own
towline."
Then he excused himself and said, "I need to
brood. . . . It's a moment of quiet around here to
search your soul and your conscience."
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